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ABSTRACT 
Restructuring of the electric power industry has caused dramatic changes in the use of 
transmission system. The increasing congestion conditions as well as the necessity of 
integrating renewable energy introduce new challenges and uncertainties to transmission 
operation and planning. Accurate short-term congestion forecasting facilitates market traders 
in bidding and trading activities. Cost sharing and recovery issue is a major impediment for 
long-term transmission investment to integrate renewable energy.  
In this research, a new short-term forecasting algorithm is proposed for predicting 
congestion, LMPs, and other power system variables based on the concept of system 
patterns. The advantage of this algorithm relative to standard statistical forecasting methods 
is that structural aspects underlying power market operations are exploited to reduce the 
forecasting error. The advantage relative to previously proposed structural forecasting 
methods is that data requirements are substantially reduced. Forecasting results based on a 
NYISO case study demonstrate the feasibility and accuracy of the proposed algorithm. 
Moreover, a negotiation methodology is developed to guide transmission investment 
for integrating renewable energy. Built on Nash Bargaining theory, the negotiation of 
investment plans and payment rate can proceed between renewable generation and 
transmission companies for cost sharing and recovery. The proposed approach is applied to 
Garver’s six bus system. The numerical results demonstrate fairness and efficiency of the 
approach, and hence can be used as guidelines for renewable energy investors. The results 
also shed light on policy-making of renewable energy subsidies. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation and Objectives  
The integration of electricity markets and renewable energy into electric power 
systems continue to increase. Transmission operation and planning have become highly 
challenging in the new environment.  
This research is aimed to tackle two challenging issues in transmission system 
operation and planning. Specifically, the first task is the development of a short-term 
congestion and price forecasting tool to facilitate bidding and trading strategy development 
for market participants. The proposed algorithm exploits both structural and statistical 
aspects of wholesale power markets, and outperforms state-of-the-art forecasting tools.  
The second task is concerned with a new methodology to guide renewable energy 
generation and transmission companies on the negotiation of transmission investment cost 
sharing and recovery. The proposed approach based on Nash Bargaining theory gives a fair 
and efficient utility allocation in the negotiation process. The negotiation is further compared 
with a centralized planning model to provide guidance for policy makers on establishing 
appropriate renewable energy subsidies.  
In many transmission regions, congestion in wholesale power markets is managed by 
Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs), the pricing of power in accordance with the location and 
timing of its power injection into or withdrawal from the transmission grid. Congestion and 
LMP forecasts are highly important for decision-making by market operators and market 
participants.  
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In short-term transmission operation, congestion occurs when the available 
economical electricity has to be delivered to load “out-of-merit-order” due to transmission 
limitations. Transmission congestion is detrimental to power system security.  It also causes 
LMP discrepancies between the constrained and unconstrained areas, which could lead to a 
high congestion cost.  Therefore, as a result of transmission congestion, high reliability risks 
and electricity price risks are faced by system operators and market participants, respectively.  
Congestion forecasting is critical to market operators as well as market participants 
[1]. Congestion forecasting tools can be used for identification of potential congestive 
conditions, detection of the exercise of market power, and scenario-conditioned planning. 
Congestion forecasting also gives interpretable signals to electricity price behaviors, and can 
be used to induce more accurate and reliable price forecasting which assists market 
participants in making decisions for bidding and trading strategies. Therefore, accurate 
forecasts of congestion and LMP also give advantages to market traders in bidding and 
trading activities and long-term investment planning.1 
In long-term system planning, major transmission projects are needed, in the United 
States and beyond, to integrate renewable resources, primarily wind generation, located 
mostly in remote areas. The delivery of renewable energy is important for meeting the 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS). As of February 2009, nearly 300,000MW of wind 
projects were waiting to be connected to the grid [2]. One factor contributing to the backlog 
                                                 
1
 For example, during an internship at Genscape, Inc., the author observed first-hand that 
the customers for Genscape’s LMP forecasting services were generation companies, load-
serving entities, and utilities interested in developing daily market bidding strategies and 
improving their over-the-counter electricity trading.  
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is the difficulty in siting transmission lines due to local oppositions. For lines crossing 
multiple states, additional difficulties arise in the permitting process due to different state 
laws and regulations. However, the real issues are the uncertainties concerning who should 
bear the transmission costs and how the transmission investments should be recovered. In 
order to meet the RPS at the mandated date, these issues need to be resolved and 
transmission projects need to be completed. 
Transmission can be separated into three categories; regulated, generation 
interconnection or merchant transmission. In general, the cost responsibility of the regulated 
transmission for reliability, economic and operational performance purposes is assigned to 
the loads benefiting from the investment via a regulated rate. The generation developers bear 
transmission cost for interconnecting its proposed generation and a transmission developer 
will be responsible for its merchant transmission project [3]. But the policy-driven 
transmission to meet RPS is a new category in which cost responsibility has not been clearly 
defined. 
Currently, a RE developer has to pay the entire cost of the generation interconnection 
transmission to the interconnected Transmission Owner through a Regional Transmission 
Organization (RTO), such as PJM, ISO-New England, and New York ISO,  prior to the in-
service date of the generator. As a result, the RE developer bears the whole risk of both 
generation and transmission investments. This increases the cost to finance a RE project and 
discourage the investment. On the contrary, the authors propose a market-based approach, 
where the unavoidable risks and uncertainties due to renewable energy intermittency could 
be shared by RE developers and transmission companies. The expected generation revenue 
will be used to fund the RE and transmission projects. 
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In this dissertation, the interconnection of a RE project is accomplished by a 
Merchant Transmission (MT) project and is coordinated between a RE Generation Company 
(RE-GenCo) and a Transmission Company (TransCo). Furthermore, the recovery of their 
investments is a result of a negotiation between the two entities using the expected generation 
profit based on the market and generation performance. Hence, a RE-GenCo waiting to be 
connected to the power grid can actively seek out a TransCo who is interested in investing in 
new transmission lines if the compensation from the RE-GenCo is sufficiently attractive. 
Negotiation then can proceed considering the uncertainties associated with outputs renewable 
resources and electricity prices. An agreement is reached if satisfactory returns are achieved 
for both companies.  
The prerequisite for a successful settlement from the negotiation between a RE-
GenCo and a TransCo is the sufficient profit margins for both parties. However, it is possible 
that the expected generation revenue may not be adequate to cover the generation and 
transmission investments plus the profit margin. Under this situation, an incentive may be 
required to assure the accomplishment of these investments. However, if an incentive is 
needed, policy makers will have to deal with the questions, “What do the incentives look like 
and what would be their optimal values?” Schumacher et al. [4] report that incentive could be 
policy initiatives to promote transmission development. FERC also eases policies [5] for MT 
developers to hold auction to attract and pre-subscribe some capacity to “anchor customers.” 
Incentive can be monetary incentives such as Renewable Energy Certificates (RECs) that 
need to be purchased by LSEs to meet the RPS [6], or energy subsidies such as Investment 
Tax Credits (ITCs) and Production Tax Credits (PTCs). Using monetary incentives, RE-
GenCos could gain an additional revenue stream that facilitates the negotiation process. 
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1.2 Literature Review 
1.2.1 Short-Term Transmission Congestion Forecasting 
Many studies have focused on electricity price forecasting. With only publicly 
available information in hand, most applicable price forecasting tools are restricted to 
statistical methods [1], [7]-[17]. For example, statistical methods are deployed to forecast the 
hourly Ontario energy price on a basis of publicly available electricity market information [7]. 
Nogales’ research in [8] is a pioneering work in the application of time series models in 
electricity price forecasting. ARIMA [9] and GARCH [10] are also used to predict electricity 
price. Meanwhile, another branch in statistical forecasting has been developed based on 
intelligent system techniques, among which neural network approaches are widely used in 
load forecasting and extended to price forecasting as well. Shahidepour in [11] primarily 
focuses on the application of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) in load and price forecasting. 
Other neural network approaches [12]-[15] are also investigated in electricity price 
forecasting. Structural models considering wholesale power market fundamentals have also 
been attempted [19]-[20].  
However, few studies have focused on congestion forecasting. Li [21] applies a 
statistical model to predict line shadow prices. EPRI [22] has developed a congestion 
forecasting model that uses sequential Monte Carlo simulation to produce a probabilistic load 
flow. The EPRI model provides congestion probabilities for transmission lines of interests, 
but it requires intensive data input to the load flow model.  
Li and Bo [23]-[24] examine LMP variation in response to load variation, and they 
predict the next binding constraint when load is increased. However, the authors also assume 
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that a particular system growth pattern exists and that load growth at each bus is proportional 
to this pattern. Most U.S. wholesale power markets operating under LMP are geographically 
large; hence, distributed loads do not necessarily exhibit proportional growth. Moreover, the 
authors’ approach has not been applied in large-scale power systems where practical issues 
of limited data availability need to be considered. 
In our study [25], a piecewise linear-affine mapping between distributed loads and 
DC-OPF system variable solutions was identified and applied to forecast congestion and 
LMPs  under the maintained assumption that complete historical information was available 
regarding the marginality (or not) of generating units and the congestion (or not) of 
transmission lines. This method is able to give an exact prediction result since it is derived 
from the core structure of a wholesale power market. However, when applied to the actual 
forecasting of large-scale wholesale power systems, data requirements become a problem. 
The needed historical generation capacity data and line flow data are either publicly 
unavailable on market operator websites or only available with some delay. Consequently, 
the correct pattern of binding constraints corresponding to any possible future load point is 
difficult to effectively identify, which in turn prevents the accurate forecasting of system 
variables.  
1.2.2 Transmission Investment for Integrating Renewable Energy 
The transmission expansion planning problem has been addressed by a number of 
researchers from technical point of view. Garces et.al proposed a bilevel approach for 
transmission planners to minimize network cost while facilitating energy trading [26]. A 
multi-objective framework is developed to handle different stakeholders’ interests [27], and 
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transmission planning models proposed in [28] and [29] take into account the demand 
uncertainty. Transmission expansion methodologies regarding the uncertainty from large-
scale wind farms are presented in [30] and [31]. Sauma and Oren [32] provide an evaluation 
method for different transmission investments based on equilibrium models with the 
consideration of interactive generation firms. 
These studies focus on solving optimal transmission investment decisions in 
centralized approaches which are usually undertaken by centralized transmission planners or 
regulatory bodies. The centralized planning is associated with a FERC approved rate method 
for the transmission developers, typically the traditional utilities, to recover their costs of 
investment. A number of rate methods have been examined in the literature. Typically, a 
postage stamp rate is adopted to recover the fixed transmission cost [33]. Different usage-
based methods are also suggested and evaluated by Pan et. al [33]. The potential fairness 
issue in usage-based methods is attempted to resolve using min-max fairness criteria [34]. In 
addition to the rate structure, Galiana et.al proposed a cost allocation methodology based on 
the principle of equivalent bilateral exchanges. The allocated cost responsibilities are then 
used to set the rates for different LSEs. Finally, different allocation and rate setting 
approaches are presented in [35]-[39]. 
Independent from the centralized planning performed by RTOs such as PJM, research 
effort has been dedicated to explore market-based transmission planning models which can 
be considered as decentralized approaches for transmission investment. Roh et al.  [40] 
proposed a coordinated transmission and generation planning model which incorporates the 
characteristics from the centralized and decentralized models. RTO acts as a coordinator 
rather than a decision maker by providing capacity signals to market participants who 
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independently decide the investment plans. Research has been conducted on merchant 
transmission projects, a market-based transmission investment in the current US electricity 
markets. Joskow and Tirole [41] examined performance attributes associated with merchant 
transmission models with the consideration of several realistic attributes of electricity 
markets and transmission networks. Salazar et al.  [42] identified the most opportunistic time 
to start a merchant transmission project from an investor point of view. In their continued 
work [43], they proposed a market-based rate design for recovering merchant transmission 
investment costs from policy makers’ point of view. 
The transmission investment model in this dissertation differs from the previous work 
in that the investment of a market-based transmission project is recovered via a negotiated 
transmission rate from a RE-GenCo to a TransCo. Negotiation results are derived and 
provide guidance for market participants in an actual negotiation process. Additionally, the 
model can be used to develop renewable energy subsidies for policy makers to design market 
incentives for promoting transmission investment and use of renewable energy resources. 
1.3 Contributions of this Dissertation 
Transmission is a critical component in power systems. Economic analysis of 
transmission system is an important task to support the decision making in short-term 
operation and planning. This dissertation is focused on the development of transmission 
congestion forecasting tool and transmission investment model for integrating renewable 
energy. The original contributions are summarized as follows: 
1. A congestion forecasting tool based on convex hull techniques 
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The proposed forecasting algorithm is a novel use of convex hull techniques to enable 
the short-term forecasting of congestion conditions, prices, and other system variables. The 
convex hull algorithm and probabilistic inclusion test effectively predict congestion patterns 
at various operating points. Compared with state-of-the-art structural forecasting models, this 
new method significantly reduces the forecasting data requirement by using only publicly 
available data but still achieves a high level of accuracy.  
2. A novel concept of system patterns to enhance the forecasting accuracy 
The forecasting algorithm proposes the new concept of system patterns as an effective 
way to take generation and transmission capacity constraints into account. This concept 
captures the core structure of wholesale power markets and hence permits more accurate 
forecasting results. The new method exploiting the system pattern concept outperforms 
traditional statistical forecasting models for large-scale power systems.  
3. A negotiation methodology for renewable energy transmission investment based on 
Nash Bargaining theory 
The proposed transmission investment model based on Nash Bargaining approach 
provides a decentralized methodology for integrating renewable energy. The negotiation 
methodology takes into account electricity market uncertainties and the intermittent nature of 
renewable energy. The negotiated results provide guidelines for renewable energy generation 
and transmission companies in sharing and recovering integration and investment cost.  
4. A new approach to evaluate renewable energy subsidy policy 
The comparison between negotiation and centralized planning addresses the issue of 
optimal subsidy policy to produce sufficient incentives for renewable energy investment. The 
optimal subsidy policy can steer the negotiated solution to a centralized solution that 
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maximizes the social surplus. The results provide important guidance for policy makers to 
establish proper renewable energy subsidies.  
1.4 Thesis Organization 
This research conducts an economic analysis for transmission operation and planning. 
Specifically for short-term transmission operation, it is intended to provide a congestion and 
price forecasting tool by analyzing the fundamentals of power markets. For long-term 
transmission planning, a systematic negotiation methodology among market participants is 
provided for renewable energy investment incorporating the stochastic nature of renewable 
resources. The comparison between the negotiation model and centralized planning model is 
a resource for decision support in policy making of renewable energy subsidies.  
Chapter 2 presents a congestion forecasting tool based on the results of [44].  A new 
short-run congestion forecasting algorithm is proposed based on the concept of system 
patterns—combinations of status flags for transmission lines and generating units. It is shown 
that the load space can be divided into convex sets within which system variables can be 
expressed as linear-affine functions of loads. Congestion forecasting is then transformed into 
the problem of identifying the correct system pattern. A convex hull algorithm is developed 
to estimate the convex sets in the load space. A point inclusion test is used to identify the 
possible system patterns and congestion conditions for a future operating point and a 
corresponding “sensitivity matrix” is used to forecast LMPs and line shadow prices. 
Forecasting results based on a NYISO case study demonstrate that the proposed forecasting 
procedure is highly efficient. 
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Chapter 3 outlines the research on transmission investment to integrate renewable 
energy. The negotiation process is analyzed for renewable energy interconnection between a 
RE-GenCo and a TransCo. Nash Bargaining theory is adopted to determine the transmission 
investment plans and RE-GenCo’s transmission payment. The negotiation methodology as 
well as its results provides an alternative means to transmission planning for integrating 
renewable energy. By modifying the included subsidies, the proposed negotiation approach 
produces results (i.e. transmission plan and rate) mirroring those from a centralized planning 
model in which the objective is to maximize the overall social surplus. The renewable energy 
subsidies can be used as an adjusting parameter to steer the investment plan derived from the 
negotiation towards an optimal plan. This result and comparison provide important guidance 
to policy makers for determining appropriate renewable energy subsidies.  
Chapter 4 provides conclusions and discusses the future research directions.  
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CHAPTER 2. SHORT-TERM TRANSMISSION CONGESTION 
FORECASTING 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a new algorithm is developed for the short-term forecasting of system 
variables in wholesale power systems with substantially reduced data requirements. This 
algorithm permits the derivation of estimated probability distributions for congestion, LMPs, 
and other DC-OPF system variable solutions in real-time markets and in forward markets 
with hour-ahead, day-ahead and week-ahead time horizons, conditional on a given 
commitment-and-line scenario that specifies a set of  generating units committed for possible 
dispatch and a set of transmission lines capable of supporting power flow. Moreover, given 
suitable availability of historical data, this scenario-conditioned forecasting algorithm can be 
generalized to a cross-scenario forecasting algorithm by the assignment of probabilities to 
different commitment-and-line scenarios.   
This new forecasting algorithm makes use of two supporting techniques in order to 
substantially reduce the amount of required data relative to [25]. The first technique is a 
method developed by Bemporad et al. [45] and Tøndel et al. [46] for dividing the parameter 
space of a Quadratic-Linear Programming (QLP) problem into convex subsets such that, 
within each convex subset, the optimal solution values can be expressed as linear-affine 
functions of the parameters. A similar technique is applied in this study to a QLP DC-OPF 
problem formulation to show that, conditional on any given commitment-and-line scenario, 
the load space can be divided into convex subsets within which the optimal DC-OPF system 
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variable solutions are linear-affine functions of load. Each convex subset corresponds to a 
unique system pattern, that is, a unique array of flags reflecting a particular pattern of binding 
minimum or maximum capacity constraints for the committed generating units and available 
transmission lines specified by the commitment-and-line scenario. 
The second technique concerns convex hull determination.  Given any collection of 
points, computational geometry [47] provides algorithms to compute the corresponding 
convex hull, i.e., the smallest convex set containing these points. Convex hull algorithms 
have been gaining popularity in the areas of computer graphics, robotics, geographic 
information systems and so forth. To date, however, they have not been applied in electricity 
market forecasting. A convex hull algorithm is used in this study to estimate the convex 
subsets of load space within which DC-OPF solutions are linear-affine functions of load 
when incomplete historical data prevent their exact determination.   
 More precisely, the proposed forecasting algorithm generates short-term forecasts for 
congestion, LMPs, and other power system variables as follows. Let L denote a vector of 
loads at some possible future operating point corresponding to a particular commitment-and-
line scenario S. A convex hull method is first used to estimate the division of load space into 
convex subsets (system pattern regions), each corresponding to a distinct historically-
observed system pattern of binding capacity constraints for the particular committed 
generating units and available transmission lines specified under S.  A probabilistic point 
inclusion test is next used to calculate the probability that L is associated with each historical 
system pattern, taking into account the imprecision with which the system pattern regions in 
load space are estimated. The congestion conditions at L are then probabilistically forecasted 
using the probability-weighted historical system patterns, and forecasts for LMPs and other 
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system variables at L are calculated using the linear-affine mapping between load and DC-
OPF system variable solutions that corresponds to each probability-weighted historical 
system pattern.  
2.2 Basic Forecasting Problem Formulation 
In electricity markets, congestion occurs when the available economical electricity 
has to be delivered to load “out-of-merit-order” due to transmission limitations. That is, 
higher-cost generation needs to be dispatched in place of cheaper generation to meet this load 
in order to avoid overload of transmission lines. In this case, the LMP levels at different 
nodes separate from each other and from the unconstrained market-clearing price. Therefore, 
congestion is a critical factor determining the formation of LMP levels. 
However, congestion patterns are difficult to anticipate since they are related to the 
network topology of power systems. Provided perfect information is available, such as 
network data, load data, and generator bidding data, a market clearing model could be 
utilized to obtain accurate forecasts of congestion conditions and prices. Nevertheless, two 
issues arise for this direct forecasting method. First, most market traders do not have direct 
access to the information that is needed to implement this method; they would have to 
depend on data published by market operators. Second, the market operators, themselves, 
would need a high degree of computational speed to carry out the required computations.  
As a result, statistical tools have been developed that tackle these two forecasting 
issues by modeling the statistical correlation between prices and explanatory factors. These 
statistical tools lack explicit consideration for congestion, partly because no effective 
approach has been developed to enable these tools to capture and express the effects of 
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congestion. Ignoring the effects of congestion makes the forecasted prices less reliable and 
difficult to interpret at operating points with abnormal price behaviors. 
Surely it is possible to glean some useful information about future possible 
congestion conditions based on statistically forecasted LMPs. However, these intuitive 
insights, based on forecasters’ experiences, cannot provide reliable congestion forecasts.  
From a cause-and-effect point of view, congestion is the cause while LMP is the effect. One 
cannot infer the cause (congestion) from the effect (LMP) since LMP is not solely driven by 
congestion. In particular, statistical LMP forecasting tools do not take into account the 
structural aspects of power markets that fundamentally drive the determination of LMPs: 
namely, the fact that LMPs are derived as solutions to optimal power flow problems subject 
to generation capacity and transmission line constraints.  
As explained more carefully in Section 2.3.1, the novel concept of a “system pattern” 
is used in this study to incorporate the structural generation capacity and transmission line 
aspects that drive congestion outcomes. The forecasting of congestion at a possible future 
operating point is thus transformed into a problem of estimating the correct system pattern at 
this operating point.  Moreover, the forecasting of prices and other system variables at this 
operating point can subsequently be undertaken using the particular linear-affine mapping 
between load and DC-OPF system variable solutions that is associated with this system 
pattern.  
This basic forecasting approach makes three simplifying assumptions. First, it is 
assumed that the forecasting of system variables at possible future operating points can be 
conditioned on a particular commitment-and-line scenario, that is, a particular generation 
commitment (designation of generating units available for dispatch) and a particular network 
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topology (designation of available transmission lines).  Second, it is assumed that a lossless 
DC-OPF problem formulation is used for the determination of LMPs and other system 
variables, implying in particular that the loss components of LMPs are neglected. Third, it is 
assumed that generator supply-offer behaviors are relatively static in the forecasting 
horizons. 
2.3 Basic Forecasting Algorithm Description 
2.3.1 System Patterns and System Pattern Regions 
At any system operating point, the number of marginal generating units and binding 
transmission constraints tends to be small compared to the number of nodes, transmission 
lines, and generating units. For example, in the Midwest Independent System Operator 
(MISO) region with 36,845 network buses and 5,575 generating units, the number of day-
ahead binding constraints is published daily and is typically observed to be less than 20 for 
an hourly interval [48]. On the other hand, high-cost units such as gas and oil units are more 
likely to become marginal units during peak hours, the number of which is modest.   
Exploiting this important characteristic of power markets, the idea of a system pattern 
is introduced consisting of a vector of flags indicating the marginal status of committed 
generating units and the congestion status of available transmission lines at any given system 
operating point; see Table 1. As long as the number of marginal generating units (labeled 0) 
and the number of congested transmission lines (labeled -1 or 1) are relatively few in number, 
the number of possible system patterns can be easily handled.  
As noted in Section 2.2, the basic congestion forecasting problem can then be 
transformed into a problem of estimating the correct system pattern for any given possible 
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future operating point. The congestion forecast is directly obtained once the system pattern is 
estimated, since the status of transmission lines is part of the system pattern. Moreover, as 
clarified below in Section 2.3.4, short-term forecasts for prices and other system variables at 
the operating point can also be obtained making use of this estimated system pattern. 
Table 1. Flags used for system patterns 
 Generating units Transmission lines 
State 
Minimum 
Capacity 
Marginal  
Unit 
Maximum 
Capacity 
Negative 
Congestion 
No  
Congestion 
Positive  
Congestion 
Flag -1 0 1 -1 0 1 
 
The proposition below provides the theoretical foundation for our proposed 
forecasting approach. The proposition uses the concept of a convex polytope for an n-
dimensional Euclidean space Rn, i.e., a region in Rn determined as the intersection of finitely 
many half-spaces in Rn. 
Proposition 1: Suppose a standard DC-OPF formulation with fixed loads and 
quadratic generator cost functions is used by a market operator to determine system variable 
solutions.  Then, conditional on any given commitment-and-line scenario S, the load space 
can be covered by convex polytopes such that: (i) the interior of each convex polytope 
corresponds to a unique system pattern; and (ii) within the interior of each convex polytope 
the system variable solutions can be expressed as linear-affine functions of the vector of 
distributed loads.  
The proof of Proposition 1, originally derived in [44], is outlined in an appendix to 
this dissertation. The proof starts with the derivation of inequality and equality constraints 
constructed from the first-order KKT conditions for a DC-OPF problem conditional on a 
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particular commitment-and-line scenario S. The inequality constraints characterize convex 
polytopes that cover the load space, where the interior of each convex polytope corresponds 
to a unique system pattern. The convex polytopes constituting the covering of the load space 
are referred to as System Pattern Regions (SPRs) for the fact that the interior of each convex 
polytope is associated with a unique system pattern.  
Within each SPR the equality constraints take the form of linear-affine equations with 
constant coefficients that describe fixed linear-affine relationships between DC-OPF system 
variable solutions and the vector of loads. The matrix of coefficients for these linear-affine 
functions gives the rates of change with regard to real-power dispatch levels for generating 
units and shadow prices for bus balance and line constraints when loads are perturbed within 
the region. This matrix is referred to below as the sensitivity matrix for this SPR.  
Figure 1 provides illustrative depictions of two SPRs, R1 and R2, together with their 
associated linear-affine mappings, when the load space is composed of two-dimensional load 
vectors L = (L1, L2). The symbol P denotes the vector of unit dispatch levels, and the symbol 
Λ  denotes the vector of dual variables.  The mappings are characterized by sensitivity 
matrices (K1, K2) and ordinate vectors ( 01K , 02K ) that are constant within each SPR, which 
implies that the DC-OPF solutions for P and Λ  can be expressed as fixed linear-affine 
functions of the load vector L within each SPR.  
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Figure 1. Illustration of two system pattern regions (SPRs) in load space 
 
2.3.2 Convex Hull Estimation of Historical SPRs 
In practice, deriving the exact form of the SPRs is difficult due to limited access to 
most of the required information. This required information includes supply offer data, 
generating unit capacity data, and transmission limit data.  
This lack of information can be overcome by applying a “convex hull algorithm” to 
historical load data to estimate SPRs. The convex hull of a point set B is the smallest convex 
set that contains all the points of B [49]. A convex hull algorithm is a computational method 
for computing the convex hull of a set B.    
Each historical load point corresponding to a particular commitment-and-line 
scenario S can in principle be associated with a distinct system pattern based on 
corresponding historical data regarding the marginal status of the committed generating units 
and the congested status of the available transmission lines. The historical SPR 
corresponding to each such historically identified system pattern can then be estimated by 
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deriving the convex hull of the collection of all historical load points that have been 
associated with this system pattern.    
This study makes use of the “QuickHull algorithm” to estimate historical SPRs 
conditional on a given commitment-and-line scenario S. The QuickHull algorithm, developed 
by Barber et al. [50], is an iterative procedure for determining all of the points constituting 
the convex hull of a finite set B. At each step, points in B that are internal to the convex hull 
of B, and hence not viable as vertices of the convex hull, are identified and eliminated from 
further consideration. This process continues until no more such points can be found. 
An illustrative application of the QuickHull algorithm for a finite planar set B is 
presented in Figure 2.  The set B is first partitioned into two subsets B1 and B2 by a line lr 
connecting a left-most upper point l to a right-most lower point r, as depicted in in Figure 
2(a). More precisely, the points in B with the smallest x value are first selected and, from 
among these points, a point with a largest y value is chosen to be the left-most upper point l; 
similarly for the right-most lower point r. For each subset B1 and B2, a point z in B that is 
furthest from lr is determined and two additional lines are constructed, lzur  from l to z and 
zr
uur from z to r; see Figure 2(b). By construction, points of B that lie strictly inside the 
resulting triangle lzr are strictly interior to the convex hull of B and hence can be eliminated 
from further consideration. The points on the triangle itself are possible vertex points for the 
boundary of the convex hull of B.   
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Figure 2. Illustration of the QuickHull algorithm 
 
To continue the recursion, the above procedure is repeated for the reduced subset 
BRed of B resulting from this elimination.  Specifically, two subsets and associated triangles 
are formed as before for BRed and the points of BRed lying within the interiors of the 
resulting triangles are eliminated. If a triangle ever degenerates to a line, then all the points 
along the line lie on the boundary of the convex hull of B by construction. For example, in 
Figure 2(c) the endpoints r and m of the line rm both lie on the boundary of the convex hull 
of B.  
 This process of elimination continues until no additional points to be eliminated can 
be found. Since B is finite, the process is guaranteed to stop in finitely many steps. All the 
convex hull points for B (boundary and interior) can be determined recursively in this manner.  
The complete convex hull for B is depicted in Figure 2(d). By construction, this convex hull 
is a planar convex polytope. 
The main advantage of the QuickHull algorithm relative to other such algorithms is 
its ability to efficiently handle high-dimensional sets B by reducing computational 
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requirements [51]. The QuickHull algorithm has been widely used in scientific applications 
and appears to be the algorithm of choice for higher-dimensional convex hull computing [52]. 
2.3.3 Basic Point Inclusion Test 
 Suppose the load space has been divided up into estimated SPRs whose interiors 
correspond to distinct system patterns, conditional on a given commitment-and-line scenario 
S. Consider, now, the task of forecasting congestion conditions at some future operating point 
a short time into the future for which scenario S again obtains. The essence of this forecasting 
problem is the detection of the correct SPR for this future operating point. If the correct SPR 
can be detected, then congested conditions can be inferred directly from the corresponding 
system pattern. 
This detection is undertaken in this study by means of a “point inclusion test”. The 
basic point inclusion test used in this study is illustrated in Figure 3 for an SPR in a load 
plane. Recall that each SPR takes the form of a convex polytope, i.e., a region expressable as 
the intersection of half-spaces; hence each SPR has flat faces with straight edges. Let the 
normal vectors pointing towards the interior of the SPR be constructed for each edge of the 
SPR. Now consider the depicted point P1, and let 1aP
uuur
 denote the vector directed from the 
vertex a to the point P1. The dot product between 1aP
uuur
 and each normal vector of each 
neighboring edge of a is greater than or equal to 0. If this is true for all vertices of the SPR, 
the point P1 is judged to be on or inside the SPR. On the other hand, one can see that P2 is 
outside the SPR since the dot product of 2aP
uuur
 and the normal vector for the neighboring edge 
connecting a to b is negative.  
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Figure 3. Illustration of the basic point inclusion test for an SPR in a load plane 
 
 As will be seen in Section 2.4, practical data-availability issues prevent the use of the 
basic point inclusion test for the exact determination of the SPR containing any possible 
future load point L. However, given a suitable probabilistic extension of this basic point 
inclusion test, the probability that any particular SPR contains L can be estimated. 
2.3.4 Linear-Affine Mapping Procedure 
Given sufficient generation and transmission information, each historical load point 
can be associated with an SPR according to the status of the generating units and 
transmission lines at the historical operating time. More precisely, given any commitment-
and-line scenario S, consider the collection of all historically observed load points obtaining 
under S.  Let this collection of historical load points be partitioned into subsets corresponding 
to distinct system patterns for scenario S.   For each load subset, use the QuickHull algorithm 
to calculate its convex hull in load space.  Each of these convex hulls then constitutes a 
distinct estimated SPR for scenario S. In principal, any future load point corresponding to 
scenario S can then be associated with one of these estimated SPRs by means of the basic 
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point inclusion test. This association permits the prediction of congestion, prices, and other 
DC-OPF system variable solutions at this load point.  
To see this more clearly, let hiY and hiL denote matrices consisting of all historically 
observed DC-OPF system solution vectors and load vectors corresponding to a particular 
system pattern i for a particular commitment-and-line scenario S.  Let the SPR in load space 
corresponding to this system pattern, denoted by Ri, be estimated by the convex hull REi of 
the collection of all of the historically observed load vectors included in hiL .   
By Proposition 1, the mapping between hiY and 
h
iL  can be expressed in the linear-
affine form 
0h h
i i i iK LY K= +                                                     (1) 
where Ki denotes the sensitivity matrix corresponding to Ri.  Normally there will be 
multiple historical operating points corresponding to any one SPR for a given commitment-
and-line scenario S.  In this case Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) can be applied to (1) to 
obtain estimates ˆ iK
 
and 0ˆ iK for iK  and 0iK , as follows: 
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ˆ( )
( ( )
T
T T hi
iT
i
TK
K
−
=
 
 
 
X X X Y                                             (2) 
where )[ ]( h TiL=X 1 .   
Now let fiL  denote a possible load vector for a future operating time that has been 
found to belong to the estimated SPR REi, as determined from a basic point inclusion test 
applied to the collection of all historically estimated SPRs corresponding to scenario S.  Then 
the forecasted vector fiY of DC-OPF system variable solutions corresponding to
f
iL  can be 
calculated as 
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0
ˆ ˆ
f f
i i i iK LY K= +                                                   (3)                                      
The above linear-affine mapping procedure is modified in Section 2.4 to 
accommodate some practical issues arising from data incompleteness. 
2.4 Extension to Probabilistic Forecasting 
Practical data availability issues arise for the implementation of the basic scenario-
conditioned forecasting algorithm outlined in Section 2.3. This section discusses how these 
issues can be addressed by means of a probabilistic extension of this basic algorithm. 
Throughout this discussion the analysis is assumed to be conditioned on a given 
commitment-and-line scenario S. 
2.4.1 Practical Data Availability Issues 
The basic scenario-conditioned forecasting algorithm proposed in Section 2.3 
assumes that historical data are available regarding binding constraints for all generating 
units and for transmission lines on an hourly basis. In actuality, however, the marginal status 
of generating units is either confidential or published with limitations. Moreover, the 
theoretical load space cannot be fully reflected by the hourly historical load data which 
represent several realizations and subsets of the complete load space. 
Due to these data limitations, in practice the set A  indexing hourly binding 
constraints cannot be completely determined. Consequently, estimates obtained for the SPRs 
could be biased. The two basic ways in which this bias could arise are illustrated in Figure 4 
for a simple two-dimensional load space. Suppose the SPR corresponding to the true binding 
constraint set A  is given by RA (area 1) in Figure 4. 
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This true SPR RA can in principle be determined by applying the basic point inclusion 
test to every possible future operating point. Suppose, however, that the practically estimated 
binding constraint set AE1 is incomplete; for example, suppose AE1 only reflects the status of 
the most frequently congested lines. Given complete historical load data, the estimated 
convex hull RE1 (area 3) would then have to be larger than the true RA (area 1) because AE1 is 
smaller (less restrictive) than the true A . In fact, however, the actual estimated convex hull 
must be based on available historical load data. Since the latter is only a subset of the full 
load space, the result will be an actual estimated convex hull RE (area 2) that lies within RE1 
(area 3). In short, incompleteness of A and incompleteness of the practical load space each 
separately introduce bias in the estimate for RA, but in opposing directions.  
 
Figure 4. Convex hull estimates for SPRs can be biased 
 
What are the practical implications of this bias for our basic forecasting algorithm? 
Two possible cases need to be handled, as illustrated in Figure 5.  
Case A: Point r in Figure 5 lies in the interior of two different estimated SPRs, 
namely, RE1 and RE2 corresponding to two distinct system patterns A1 and A2. The true SPRs 
corresponding to A1 and A2 are denoted by the shaded regions RA1 and RA2, respectively. The 
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fact that the interiors of the true SPRs do not overlap follows from Proposition 1. However, 
as explained above, overlap can occur for the interiors of estimated SPRs due to bias. 
Case B: Point t in Figure 5 is actually in the true SPR RA2.  However, point t cannot 
be assigned to either of the estimated SPRs because the bias in these estimates has caused 
point t to lie outside of both of them.  
 
Figure 5. Two possible types of forecast error due to biased SPR estimates 
 
2.4.2 Probabilistic Point Inclusion Test 
To mitigate the issues arising from the two types of bias discussed in Section 2.4.1, 
mean and interval forecasting can be performed for the DC-OPF system variable solutions 
corresponding to any forecasted future load point Lf. This probabilistic forecasting can be 
implemented by estimating the probability of each SPR conditional on Lf, which can be 
characterized as a probabilistic point inclusion test. 
More precisely, let Lf denote the forecasted load at a future operating point f, and let 
Ri denote any particular SPR i. Let the collection of all historically identified SPRs be 
denoted by Rh, and let CR denote the cardinality of Rh. Suppose the probability of occurrence 
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for any SPR not in Rh is zero. Then the probability that Ri has occurred, given that Lf has been 
observed, can be expressed as: 
( )( ) ( | )| ( | ( ))
h
i i
i
f
f
Ri
i
i
f R P RP R
R P R
P LL
P L
∈
=
∑
                                             (4) 
In practice, the various terms in (4) have to be estimated.  In this study it will be 
assumed that the prior probability ( )iP R  is an empirical prior estimated by the historical 
frequency of Ri:  namely, the number of times in the past that Ri has been observed to occur 
divided by the total number of all past SPR observations.  
The term ( )|f iP L R  in (4) represents the probability of observing the load point Lf 
given that the true SPR is Ri.  Intuitively, this probability should be a decreasing function of 
the distance between Lf and Ri. Therefore, this probability is estimated in this study as 
follows:  
( / )
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=
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                                            (5) 
In (5) the term Di denotes the (Euclidean) distance between Lf and Ri, and TD denotes 
the total distance calculated as the sum of the distances between Lf and each SPR in Rh. The 
normalization parameter γ in (5) can be adjusted to obtain an appropriate conditional 
probability measure, possibly by using historical data as training cases. A specification 
0γ = results in a uniform conditional probability (5) for Lf: namely, 1 divided by the 
cardinality CR of Rh. In this case (5) is independent of the distance measures Di. 
Alternatively, a specification 1γ = implies the conditional probability (5) is derived from a 
linear normalization, while 2γ = corresponds to a quadratic normalization. As will be shown 
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below, the quadratic normalization form of the conditional probability (5) results in good 
forecasts for our NYISO case study.   
Mean forecasts for the DC-OPF system variable solutions at the operating point f with 
forecasted load point Lf can then be obtained using the estimated form for the conditional 
probability assessments (4), denoted by fiP for short. Let fiY denote the forecasted DC-OPF 
system variable solution vector corresponding to any historical SPR Ri in Rh. The mean 
forecast fY can then be calculated as  
h
f f f
i i
i R
PY Y
∈
= ∑                                                         (6) 
A forecaster might also be interested in calculating upper and lower bounds for the 
DC-OPF system variable solutions calculated with respect to the most likely SPRs. Let nmp 
denote the forecaster’s desired cut-off number of most probable SPRs, and let MP represent 
the subset of Rh that contains these nmp most probable SPRs. Then the upper bound UBf and 
lower bound LBf for each forecasted DC-OPF system variable solution can be determined 
over the set of SPRs in MP. As a measure of dispersion, the forecaster can further consider 
the coverage probability CP, defined to be the summation of the probability assessments (4) 
for the nmp most probable SPRs. 
Finally, another alternative might be for the forecaster to consider mean forecasts 
calculated using the nmp most probable SPRs, i.e. the subset MP of Rh. For example, a 
forecaster could choose nmp=1, which would result in a point forecast for the DC-OPF 
system variable solutions based on a single most likely SPR Ri in Rh as determined from the 
estimated form of the conditional probability assessments (4). 
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2.4.3 Probabilistic Forecasting Algorithm 
Taking into account the practical data issues addressed in Sections 2.4.1and 2.4.2, our 
proposed probabilistic forecasting algorithm proceeds in four steps, as follows: 
Step 1: Perform historical data processing to identify historical system patterns. Use 
the QuickHull algorithm to estimate historical SPRs as convex hulls of historically observed 
load points corresponding to distinct historical system patterns.   
Step 2: For each historical SPR estimated in Step 1, a linear-affine mapping between 
load vectors and DC-OPF system variable solution vectors is derived using historical load 
and system variable data. The system variable solution vectors include real-power dispatch 
levels and dual variables for nodal balance and transmission line constraints. The linear-
affine mapping is characterized by a sensitivity matrix and an ordinate vector. 
Step 3: For any possible load point Lf in the near future for which system variable 
forecasts are desired, a probabilistic point inclusion test is performed. More precisely, the 
estimated form of the conditional probability distribution (4) is used to estimate the 
probability that Lf lies in each of the historical SPRs identified in Step 1.   
Step 4: The results from Steps 1-3 are used to generate probabilistic forecasts at the 
future possible operating point Lf for generation capacity and transmission congestion 
conditions (system patterns) as well as for DC-OPF system variable solutions for dispatch 
levels and dual variables (including LMPs). For example, these probabilistic forecasts could 
take the form of mean and interval forecasts, or they could be point forecasts based on a most 
probable SPR. 
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2.5 Five-Bus System: Basic Forecasting 
The input data file for the 5-bus test case included in the download of the AMES 
Wholesale Power Market Test Bed [53] is used below to illustrate basic forecasting 
algorithm outlined in Section 2.3. As depicted in Figure 6, this 5-bus test case has six 
transmission lines (TL1-TL6), five generation units (G1-G5), and three load-serving entities 
(LSE 1-LSE 3).  
The AMES test bed implements a wholesale power market operating over a 
transmission network with congestion managed by LMP [54]. Profit-seeking generation units 
in AMES are able to learn over time how to report their supply offers based on their past 
profit outcomes. In this study, however, it is assumed that each generation unit reports its true 
cost and capacity attributes to the ISO each day for the day-ahead energy market.  
The load data for our 5-bus case study are scaled-down time-varying loads derived 
from load data available at the MISO website [55]. Using this load data, AMES was run for 
365 simulated days in order to determine historical system patterns s. The sensitivity matrix 
and ordinate vector for each of these patterns was then calculated. System pattern 
determination and system variable prediction were carried out for various possible distributed 
load patterns. These steps are explained more carefully in the following subsections.  
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Figure 6. 5-bus network 
 
2.5.1 Historical System Patterns and the Corresponding Sensitivity 
Matrices 
Nine system patterns were identified from the AMES output obtained from the 365 
simulated days using a year of scaled-down MISO load data. The four most frequently 
observed system patterns are displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2. The four most frequent historical system patterns for the 5-bus system 
Pattern G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 TL1 TL2 TL3 TL4 TL5 TL6 
S1 1 0 -1 -1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S2 0 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S3 1 0 0 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
S4 1 0 -1 -1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The sensitivity matrix and ordinate vector for each of the nine historical system 
patterns were then estimated making use of actual system operating points observed for each 
historical system pattern. To illustrate, we compute the sensitivity matrix and ordinate vector 
for the dispatch level of generation unit G1 in system pattern S4. Specifically, using four 
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historically observed operating points t = 1,…,4 associated with system pattern S4, a set of 
four linear equations was determined as follows: 
1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
1 11 1 12 2 13 3 14
P P P PJ OP L J L J L= + + +                                             (7) 
4 4 42 2 4
1 11 1 12 2 13 3
2 2
14
P P P PJ L J L J LP O= + + +                                            (8) 
4 4 43 3 4
1 11 1 12 2 13 3
3 3
14
P P P PJ L J L J LP O= + + +                                            (9) 
4 4 44 4 4
1 11 1 12 2 13 3
4 4
14
P P P PJ L J L J LP O= + + +
                                        
 (10) 
 
Here 1
tP  denotes the dispatch level of G1 at operating point t and tjL  denotes the load 
level of LSE j at operating point t. These four equations determine solution values for the 
four unknown variables 411PJ , 412PJ , 413PJ and 41PO . The superscript “P4” represents the dispatch 
level P in system pattern S4. The subscript “11” denotes the dispatch level of G1 with respect 
to load level of LSE 1. The first three solution values determine one row of the block 
matrix 4PJ , hence also one row of the sensitivity matrix 4J  for system pattern S4. The last 
solution value determines one element of 4PO , hence one element of the ordinate vector 4O  
for system pattern S4. Other rows and elements can be similarly computed. The sensitivity 
matrix and ordinate vector for S4 are partially shown in Table 3. 
2.5.2 Predicting System Pattern, Congestion and System Variables 
Now suppose that a certain distributed load pattern is forecasted for the near future. 
For example, suppose the forecasted loads for buses 1 through 3 in a particular hour H are L1 
= 245.50MW, L2 = 211.64MW, and L3 = 170.17MW. An iterative assume-check procedure 
can then be undertaken to determine which system pattern corresponds to these forecasted 
load conditions. Since complete information is available for prediction, the correct system 
pattern can be found precisely. In this five bus case, the correct system pattern is found to be 
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S3.  LMP and congestion predictions generated for these forecasted loads under system 
pattern S3 are reported in Table 4, along with the actual LMPs and congestion resulting 
under this load condition.  
Table 3. Sensitivity matrix and ordinate vector for system pattern S4 (partially shown) 
OLMP JLMP 
23.83
3400.00
2729.20
994.43
52.79
 
 − 
 −
 
− 
 − 
 
0.02 0.03 0.01
8.74 7.12 2.35
7.02 5.72 1.89
2.59 2.09 0.71
0.17 0.15 0.05
− − 
 
 
 
 
 
 − 
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6679.66
0
0
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 
 
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0 0 0
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0 0 0
0 0 0
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 
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0 0 0
1.43 1.05 0.03
15.78 12.87 4.20
1.0 0 0
0.89 0.92 0.03
2.14 1.84 0.94
 
 − − − 
 − − −
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− 
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Table 4. LMP and line congestion predictions under S3 
LMPS LMP1 LMP2 LMP3 LMP4 LMP5 
Predicted 15.14 29.50 26.79 19.29 15.84 
Actual 15.12 29.49 26.77 19.28 15.86 
Congested lines Predicted: TL1 Actual: TL1 
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The proposed approach is also tested for the prediction of LMPs and line flows over 
successive hours. Figure 7 and Figure 8 display the predicted and actual values for the power 
flow on line TL1 and the LMP at bus 2 for all 24 hours of the simulated day 363. As seen, 
the predicted values are nearly coincident with the actual values, differing only by small 
computational round-off and truncation errors. 
 
Figure 7. Predicted hourly power flow on line TL1 during day 363 
 
Figure 8. Predicted LMP at bus 2 during day 363 
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2.6 NYISO Case Study: Probabilistic Forecasting  
2.6.1 Case Study Overview 
A case study using NYISO 2007 data is reported in this section for the probabilistic 
scenario-conditioned forecasting algorithm presented in Section 2.4. NYISO has a footprint 
covering 11 load zones [56]. Short-term zonal load forecasting data and binding constraints 
data are available at the NYISO website [57].  
This forecasting algorithm is applicable for power markets using either nodal or zonal 
LMP pricing, since Proposition 1 does not rule out either form of pricing.  However, 
NYISO’s website [57] only posts daily zonal load data for its 11 load zones, which makes it 
impossible to forecast prices down to each node. In addition, historical NYISO price data 
reveal the similarity of LMPs within some of these 11 load zones, hence the negligibility of 
inter-zonal congestion between these zones.  For this reason, to reduce our computational 
burden without any significant loss of information, we chose to reduce the original 11 load 
zones for the NYISO to 8 load zones by combining Zone Millwood with Dunwoodie, and 
Zone West and Genesee with Central.   
The top 25 most frequently congested high-voltage transmission lines during 2007 for 
the NYSIO day-ahead market are studied in [58]. The focus of our case study is on the five 
most frequently congested high-voltage transmission lines during 2007, specifically, 
DUNWODIE 345 SHORE RD 345 1 (D-S), CENTRAL EAST-VC (C-V), PLSNTVLY 345 
LEEDS 345 1 (P-L), WEST CENTRAL (W-C), SPRNBRK 345 EGRDNCTR 345 1 (S-E). 
Since the marginal status of generating units is not available from the NYISO, the 
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conditioning scenario for this empirical study is taken to be the availability of these five lines. 
System patterns are thus equivalent to congestion patterns for these five lines. 
Regarding time period, we selected 12 test days consisting of the last day of each 
month in 2007. The 24 operating hours starting from 0:00 for each test day were treated as 
future operating points. Forecasted load data at these hours were used to identify system 
patterns and to generate system variable forecasts. These forecasted results were then 
compared with actual realizations to evaluate the performance of our algorithm. Due to space 
limitations, graphical illustrations are presented only for January 31st and February 28th; 
numerical results for the last days of other months are given in tables.  
All calculations for this case study were implemented using Matlab 7.8 on an Intel 
Core 2 PC with 3.0GHz CPU. The computational time for each daily forecast was about 2 
minutes. 
2.6.2 Implementation of Probabilistic Forecasting 
Historical price and load data were first processed to identify historical system 
patterns and SPRs, which is Step 1 of our probabilistic forecasting algorithm. Sorted by 
congestion patterns, about 19 to 30 historical system patterns (hence SPRs) were found for 
each forecasted day. For example, the four most frequently observed congestion patterns for 
January 31st are shown in Table 5. System patterns for other days are categorized similarly. 
Step 2 of our algorithm was then carried out. Specifically, the sensitivity matrix and 
ordinate vector for each historical SPR were estimated by ordinary least squares, making use 
of the actual system operating points observed for each historical system pattern. 
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Table 5. Four most frequent historical congestion patterns for 01/31/2007 
Pattern D-S C-V P-L S-C S-E 
P1 1 0 0 0 0 
P2 0  0 0 0 0 
P3 1 1 0 0 0 
P4 1 1 0 1 0 
In Step 3, forecasted load data for the 24 operating hours of each test day were then 
treated as possible future load points. For each of the latter points, the probabilistic point 
inclusion test detailed in Section 2.4.2 was used to assign estimated conditional probability 
assessments (4) giving the probability that this future load point was contained within each  
historical SPR. In these Step 3 calculations, we first evaluated the forecasting performance of 
three values (0, 1, and 2) for the normalization parameter γ  in (5) on the basis of historical 
data. The specification γ  = 2 gave the best forecast results for most historical days; hence, 
this value was chosen to forecast system variables for the future load points.  
Finally, in Step 4 the results of Steps 1-3 above were used to generate probabilistic 
forecasts in the form of mean and interval forecasts. For the mean forecasts, nmp was set 
equal to the cardinality CR of Rh.  For the interval forecasts, nmp was set equal to 4. 
For the interval forecasts, the size of nmp (i.e. the cut-off number of most probable 
SPRs) depends on the forecaster’s desired trade-off between accuracy and precision. A larger 
nmp tends to increase forecasting accuracy, in the sense that there is a better chance the 
correct SPR will be among the considered SPRs. On the other hand, the precision of any 
resulting mean forecast is correspondingly reduced (i.e., the variance of the forecasts across 
the considered SPRs is increased). In the current study, the specification nmp=4 is used for 
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interval forecasts because it results in good precision without significant loss of coverage 
probability.   
2.6.3 Congestion Pattern Forecasts 
Table 6 reports the four most probable hourly congestion patterns, along with their 
associated estimated conditional probabilities and coverage probability CP (based on nmp=4), 
for every fifth hour of January 31st, 2007, starting from hour 0:00. Actual congestion patterns 
corresponding to each reported hour are highlighted in gray. As seen, for the reported hours 
the actual congestion pattern is always included among the forecasted congestion patterns 
and has the highest estimated conditional probability. For future reference, note also that the 
first entry of the actual congestion pattern, corresponding to transmission line D-S, is always 
1. This indicates that D-S is frequently congested. 
The multiple forecasted congestion patterns associated with each reported hour in 
Table 6 represent several credible congestion scenarios that could occur in the future. If a 
forecaster desires to derive one forecast for the future congestion pattern, an intuitively 
reasonable option would be to select a forecasted congestion pattern that has the highest 
associated conditional probability (4). As observed in Table 6, for the case study at hand this 
approach would result in the correct prediction of the actual congestion pattern for each 
reported hour. In general, however, more reliable forecasts for system conditions and DC-
OPF system variable solutions would be obtained by making fuller use of the conditional 
probability assessments (4) to form mean forecasts and interval forecasts. 
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Table 6. Forecasted congestion patterns versus the actual pattern on 01/31/2007 
Time Forecasted Probabilities CP Actual 
0:00 
1   0   0   0   0 
0   0   0   0   0 
1   1   0   0   0 
1   1   0   1   0 
0.3632 
0.2411 
0.2066 
0.1432 
0.9541 1   0   0   0   0 
5:00 
1   0   0   0   0 
0   0   0   0   0 
1   1   0   0   0 
1   1   0   1   0 
0.3451 
0.2043 
0.2418 
0.1486 
0.9398 1   0   0   0   0 
10:00 
1   0   0   0   0 
0   0  -1   0   0 
1   1   0   0   0 
1   1   0   1   0 
0.4237 
0.0236 
0.3654 
0.1299 
0.9426 1   0   0   0   0 
15:00 
1   0   0   0   0 
0   0  -1   0   0 
1   1   0   0   0 
1   1   0   1   0 
0.3661 
0.0271 
0.4243 
0.1277 
0.9452 1   1   0   0   0 
20:00 
1   0   0   0   0 
0   0   0   0   0 
1   1   0   0   0 
1   1   0   1   0 
0.4247 
0.0244 
0.3612 
0.1332 
0.9435 1   0   0   0   0 
 
2.6.4 Mean Forecasts for LMPs 
One of the benefits of congestion forecasting is to enable the more precise prediction 
of LMPs for market operators and traders in their short-term decision making. Forecasted and 
actual LMPs for Zone Central on Jan 31st and Feb 28th are shown in and Figure 9. Root Mean 
Squared Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) [11] are used as 
measures of forecast accuracy: 
24
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Figure 9. Actual versus mean LMP forecasts for Zone Central on 01/31/2007 
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Figure 10. Actual versus mean LMP forecasts for Zone Central on 02/28/2007 
 
Table 7 reports the RMSE and MAPE obtained using our probabilistic forecasting 
algorithm for each of our 12 test days.  Corresponding forecast results obtained using a well-
known statistical model – the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity 
(GARCH) model [10]– are also shown for comparison. As seen, except for the slightly 
smaller MAPE value attained in February using GARCH, our forecasting algorithm 
outperforms GARCH in the sense that smaller RMSE and MAPE values are obtained.  
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Table 7. RMSE and MAPE values for the twelve test days 
 
Day RMSE MAPE 
Model Proposed Alg. GARCH Proposed Alg. GARCH 
01/31/2007 5.026 8.689 0.0525 0.0902 
02/28/2007 3.393 4.465 0.0472 0.0384 
03/31/2007 4.029 7.094 0.0677 0.0727 
04/30/2007 4.853 8.297 0.0535 0.1005 
05/31/2007 7.401 14.741 0.0934 0.1198 
06/30/2007 3.439 13.359 0.0679 0.1485 
07/31/2007 3.941 11.623 0.0530 0.1082 
08/31/2007 4.076 5.913 0.0671 0.0781 
09/30/2007 3.249 6.636 0.0603 0.0862 
10/31/2007 4.135 8.561 0.0638 0.1176 
11/30/2007 6.476 7.208 0.0770 0.0855 
12/31/2007 7.051 14.185 0.0903 0.1435 
 
2.6.5 Interval Forecasts for Line Shadow Prices and LMPs 
Interval forecasting is recommended over mean forecasting for line shadow prices. As 
clarified below, interval forecasting is more informative than mean forecasting for line 
shadow prices because the underlying attribute of interest (negative-direction, zero, or 
positive-direction congestion) is measured by a discretely-valued indicator (-1, 0, or 1). 
Hourly upper-bound and lower-bound interval forecasts for the line shadow prices on 
line D-S on January 31st and Feb 28th are shown in Figure 11and Figure 12 along with actual 
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line shadow prices for comparison.  As seen, the actual line shadow prices for most hours fall 
within the forecasted intervals.  
To better interpret these findings, consider the Table 6 results which forecast that line 
D-S (the first congestion pattern entry) will be either congested or not during hour 20 with 
varying probabilities.  If congestion is forecasted, it is in the positive direction (+1); and, 
from Figure 11, the line shadow price is estimated to be about $60/MWh. On the other hand, 
if no congestion is forecasted (0), then from Figure 11 the line shadow price is estimated to 
be $0/MWh.  
One final point for interval forecasts for line shadow prices is important to note.  For 
lines for which no congestion occurs in any of the reported congestion patterns (e.g., line S-E 
in Table 6), the corresponding upper and lower bounds for the forecasted line shadow price 
interval will both be zero, indicating zero congestion.   
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Figure 11. Actual versus interval D-S line shadow price forecasts on 01/31/2007 
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Figure 12. Actual versus interval D-S line shadow price forecasts on 02/28/2007 
 
Interval forecasts for Zone Central LMPs on January 31st and February 28th are shown 
in Figure 13 and Figure 14 along with actual LMP values for comparison. For most hours the 
actual LMP values fall within the upper and lower bounds of the forecasted intervals.    
The interval forecasting performance for line shadow prices and zonal LMPs is 
measured using the accuracy-informativeness tradeoff model developed in [59]. The 
statistical loss function LOSS is defined to be 
| | ( )y m ln g
g
LOSS δ− +=                                                         (13) 
In (13), y denotes the actual value, m denotes the midpoint of the forecasted interval, 
and ln(g) denotes the natural logarithm of the width g of the forecasted interval. Also, δ  
determines the tradeoff between accuracy (the first term) and informativeness (the second 
term); in this case study δ  is set to 1. Note that a smaller LOSS indicates better performance 
for interval forecasting.  
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Table 8 gives the LOSS values for the interval forecasts obtained for line shadow 
price and zonal LMPs using our probabilistic forecasting algorithm versus the forecasts 
obtained using a statistical GARCH model. As seen, our probabilistic forecasting algorithm 
results in uniformly lower LOSS values than GARCH, indicating a better forecasting 
performance.   
A possible explanation for this performance difference is that GARCH has difficulty 
handling the volatility of line shadow prices, which can abruptly change from 0 to large non-
zero values. In contrast, our probabilistic forecasting algorithm captures the physical 
meaning of these line shadow prices and this facilitates better forecasting. 
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Figure 13. Actual versus interval LMP forecasts for Zone Central on 01/31/2007 
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Figure 14. Actual versus interval LMP forecasts for Zone Central on 02/28/2007 
 
Table 8. Loss function values as a measure of interval forecasting performance  
Day Shadow Price Forecasting LMP Forecasting 
Model Proposed Alg. GARCH Proposed Alg. GARCH 
01/31/2007 3.824 4.063 2.896 4.196 
02/28/2007 3.729 3.977 2.835 3.649 
03/31/2007 3.236 3.672 2.574 3.633 
04/30/2007 3.398 3.778 3.133 4.164 
05/31/2007 3.493 4.187 3.421 4.032 
06/30/2007 3.838 3.897 3.365 4.425 
07/31/2007 2.726 3.350 2.839 4.892 
08/31/2007 2.916 3.352 2.787 3.624 
09/30/2007 3.140 3.567 2.245 3.965 
10/31/2007 2.825 3.335 2.725 3.799 
11/30/2007 3.256 3.738 3.088 3.537 
12/31/2007 3.481 3.962 3.164 3.919 
 
47 
 
In this study we observed that, in some months (January, May, November, and 
December), the peak-hour LMPs and line shadow prices were difficult to forecast with 
precision. This phenomenon could possibly be due to changes in the generating unit 
commitment pattern or in the transmission network topology over the forecast horizon.  To 
enhance peak-hour forecasting results, more careful collection of historical data might be 
needed to ensure that these historical data correspond to the same commitment-and-line 
scenario as the forecasted point. Alternatively, as discussed in the following Section 2.7, an 
extended cross-scenario forecast study could be attempted. 
2.7 Extension to Cross-Scenario Forecasting 
To this point, the forecasting algorithm developed in this study has been conditioned 
on a given commitment-and-line scenario S specifying a particular generating unit 
commitment pattern and a particular transmission network topology.  One interpretation of S 
is that it represents anticipated conditions at a future operating point for which forecasts are 
desired.  Another interpretation of S is that it represents a possible future system contingency 
(e.g., an N-1 outage scenario) under consideration in a contingency planning study. 
A possibly useful extension of this algorithm would be to assign probabilities to 
distinct scenarios, thus permitting the probabilistic cross-scenario blending of forecasts. 
These scenarios could be characterized not only on the basis of system patterns, i.e., 
generating unit commitments and transmission network topology, but also on the basis of a 
variety of other types of contingencies.  
As illustrated in Figure 15, for any future operating point whose system conditions 
need to be forecasted, the corresponding generating unit commitment, transmission network 
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topology, and other contingencies could be projected with some probabilities. In each of 
these projected scenarios, our scenario-conditioned forecasting algorithm could be applied to 
estimate congestion, LMPs, and other system variables.  The final forecast for any system 
variable of interest could then be the expected value of this system variable calculated across 
all projected scenarios.  
System 
Pattern 
1 System Pattern 
2
Historical operating points
Scenario 1 Scenario 2
New forecasted point
P2P1
 
Figure 15. Scenario-conditioned and cross-scenario forecasting 
49 
 
CHAPTER 3. TRANSMISSION INVESTMENT FOR INTEGRATING 
RENEWABLE ENERGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a method is proposed to support the negotiation process for renewable 
energy integration between a Renewable Energy (RE) Generation Company (RE-GenCo) and 
a Transmission Company (TransCo). The process begins with a prudent development of 
transmission plans by the two companies, taking into consideration the intermittency of 
renewable energy such as wind generation. Then the payment from the RE-GenCo to the 
TransCo is negotiated. If the payment is low, the TransCo may not fully recover its 
investment; if the payment is high, the RE-GenCo is not profitable. Hence the parties could 
fail to reach an agreement. Note that this study can also be extended to include a LSE who 
can contract to purchase a certain amount of renewable energy.  
Nash Bargaining theory is applied to determine the transmission investment plans and 
RE-GenCo’s transmission payment. The Nash bargaining solution gives a fair and efficient 
utility allocation for the two companies. The negotiation methodology as well as its results 
provides guidelines to transmission investors for integrating renewable energy under 
uncertainties. The negotiation is then compared with a centralized planning model to evaluate 
renewable energy subsides. The comparison shed light to policy makers on designing proper 
renewable energy subsidies.  
 
50 
 
3.2 Nomenclature 
Indices and sets: 
n Index for buses 
s Index for scenarios 
t Index for subperiods 
i Index for generators 
j Index for loads 
b Index for supply or bid blocks 
k Index for transmission lines 
o(k) Sending-end of transmission line k 
r(k) Receiving-end of transmission line k 
R Index for the bus where renewable generation will be invested 
Ir Index for the renewable generator invested by the RE-GenCo 
NΩ  Set of all system buses 
TΩ  Set of all subperiods 
SΩ  Set of all scenarios 
G
nΩ  Set of generators at Bus n 
L
nΩ  Set of loads at Bus n 
b
iΩ  Set of blocks of Generator i 
b
jΩ  Set of blocks of Load j 
TGΩ  Set of traditional generators 
RGΩ  Set of renewable generators 
ETΩ  Set of existing transmission lines 
CTΩ  Set of candidate transmission lines 
GΩ  Set of all system generators 
LΩ  Set of all system loads 
Parameters: 
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tD  Duration of subperiod t 
G
ibλ  Offer price of the bth block by the ith generator 
L
jbλ  Bid price of the bth block by the jth load 
kICT  Annualized investment cost of transmission line k 
G
ibP  Size of the bth block for the ith generator 
L
jbP  Size of the bth block for the jth load 
R
ibtsP  Size of the bth block for the ith renewable generator at subperiod t in 
scenario s 
kF  Transmission capacity of line k 
kx  Transmission reactance of line k 
SUB Parameter of renewable energy subsidies 
RGIC  Annualized investment cost of renewable generation  
RGd  Threat point of the RE-GenCo 
Td  Threat point of the TransCo 
FP
 
Renewable energy contract price ($/MWh) for RE-GenCo  
Decision variables: 
G
ibtsP  Electricity produced by the bth block of ith generator at subperiod t in scenario s. 
kY  Electricity consumed by the bth block of jth load at subperiod t in scenario s. 
λ  Negotiated payment from the RE-GenCo to the TransCo. 
ktsF  Power flow of transmission line k at subperiod t in scenario s. 
ntsLMP  LMP of Bus n at subperiod t in scenario s.  
3.3 Problem Formulation 
3.3.1 Overview 
This section describes the negotiation process between a RE-GenCo and a TransCo. 
Assuming that a RE-GenCo has decided to invest in a RE project at a remote location, the 
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RE-GenCo can pay a construction company to build the interconnection transmission if, in 
the business case, the RE-GenCo can demonstrate with certainty that the projected output and 
the electricity price allows it to recover both the generation and transmission investments. In 
this case, the RE-GenCo would assume all profit risks and uncertainties. However, due to the 
intermittent nature of the generation output, the RE-GenCo may not want to do so. Instead, 
the RE-GenCo may seek out a TransCo who is interested in investing in transmission, to bear 
part of the risks. The risk transfer is consummated by the RE-GenCo paying the TransCo a 
transmission rate, based on the projected generation performance and electricity prices, for 
recovering the transmission investment. The payment, measured by a rate λ  ($/MWh) 
multiplied by dispatched renewable energy (MWh), necessitates a negotiation among two 
parties. 
To simplify the discussion, several assumptions are made. First, the utilities are 
presented in annualized terms in the sense that the calculation is conducted for a typical year 
with annualized cost components. Second, maintenance costs are not explicitly modeled 
since an annualized maintenance cost can be included as part of the annual capital 
investments. Third, a risk neutral attribute is assumed so that the RE-GenCo’s utility RGU and 
the TransCo’s utility TU can be expressed as expected profits of the two participants. These 
simplifications can be easily relaxed. 
3.3.2 Negotiation Process 
Two possible outcomes can be reached during a negotiation; an agreement is reached 
or both parties walk away. For the first outcome, an agreement is reached if the RE-GenCo, 
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after paying the negotiated transmission rate, can recover its generation investment and, at 
the same time, the TransCo can recover its transmission investment.  
A bilateral contract signed with LSEs is assumed for the RE-GenCo to manage price 
fluctuations in an electricity market. This assumption is valid since a number of electric 
utilities have issued long-term (10+ years) power purchase agreements, according to [60]. 
Considering the projected generation output and a payment to the TransCo, the utility 
function of the risk-neutral RE-GenCo given a set of future scenarios SΩ is defined by 
[[ ] ]
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=∑ , representing production cost for the RE unit. Note that the 
generation investment can be included in (14). However, it is, instead, used as the RE-
GenCo’s threat point, dRG. 
If the RE-GenCo does not sign bilateral contracts with LSEs, it confronts an exposure 
to market price uncertainties. The utility function (14) can be modified to a market-based 
version MRGU , taking into account market-based electricity prices at its bus R (i.e. Locational 
Marginal Prices (LMPs)). 
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For the TransCo, if an agreement is achieved, the profit collected by the TransCo 
from the RE-GenCo's payment with the subtraction of transmission investment can be 
expressed as  
[ ]
S
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 (16)         
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In the alternative in which no agreement is reached, the transmission investment will 
not occur. In this case, the failure to reach an agreement results in the RE-GenCo utility 
function arriving at its threat point, RGd , which is set as the stranded RE generation 
investment, RGIC . Likewise, if the TransCo receives no payment, the TransCo’s utility 
function is settled at its threat point Td which equals 0. 
With knowledge of the utility functions, threat points and projected market conditions, 
a negotiation process is initiated on the transmission investment plan and the associated 
transmission rate/payment. The process is depicted in Figure 16. While the two companies 
negotiate, they anticipate the market operation whose results (LMPs, generation outputs and 
transmission flows) in turn will affect their attained profit. Therefore, they tend to choose the 
transmission plan and payment rate which benefit them most.  
Foresee
Negotiation variables:
Negotiated rate
Transmission plans
Operation variables:
LMPs 
Generation outputs
Transmission flows
ISO market 
operation
URG,UT,dRG,dT
Negotiation
 
Figure 16. Negotiation between the RE-GenCo and the TransCo 
 
In the negotiation process, both the RE-GenCo and the TransCo take into 
consideration the intermittent nature of the generation output, the planned transmission 
capacity with its associated investment cost, and the electricity prices. Due to the complexity 
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and inter-relationship between the negotiated results and the transmission investment plan, it 
entails a careful examination of negotiation methodology and solution, which is presented in 
Section 3.4. 
 
3.3.3 Policy implications on RE subsidies 
Optimal transmission investment plans are aimed by policy makers to maximize 
social surplus, but cannot be directly imposed on merchant transmission investment in a 
competitive market environment. A possible approach to steer the negotiated transmission 
investment plans towards the social optimal investment is to make use of the controllable RE 
subsidy parameter SUB, an important component in both companies’ utility functions. With 
everything else unchanged, the negotiated solution can be expressed as a non-linear function 
of SUB. By adjusting this RE subsidy parameter, policy makers then can possibly alter the 
negotiated solution to match the social optimal transmission investment plan. 
The social optimal solution is derived from a centralized transmission planning. The 
objective is to maximize social surplus (the operation surplus minus transmission investment 
cost, subject to operation and planning constraints). Contrasting the negotiated solution with 
the centralized solution, an optimal RE subsidy parameter can be obtained to provide 
guidance to policy makers. The details of the model construction and comparison are 
illustrated in Section 3.5. 
3.4 Negotiation: A Nash Bargaining Approach 
The result between the RE-GenCo and the TransCo in the negotiation process 
described in Section 3.3 is solved by applying the Nash Bargaining theory. Specifically, a 
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two-player Nash Bargaining problem and its solution concept are applied to the negotiation 
problem to derive the analytical model and detailed formulation. 
3.4.1 Nash Bargaining 
The research on two-person bargaining problems is initiated by Nash [61], [62]. In his 
seminal work, the bargaining problem is defined when two players, who negotiate over a 
utility possibility set U , with their threat points 1 2( , )d d d= , try to achieve a settlement 
point 1 2( , )u u u= . Nash proved that for every bargaining problem ( , )dU , there is a unique 
solution 1 2( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )f d f d f d=U U U that satisfies the following four axioms. 
• Axiom 1. Invariance to linear transformation: For any monotonic linear-affine 
function H , it requires that ( ( ), ( )) ( ( , ))f H H d H f d=U U . This essentially needs the 
solution be agnostic of any linear-affine transformations, i.e. shifting and scaling. 
• Axiom 2. Symmetry: if 1 2d d= , 1 2( , )u u ∈U  and 2 1( , )u u ∈U , 
then 1 2( , ) ( , )f d f d=U U . This indicates that the solution should provide equal gains from 
the cooperation when the feasible utility set U is symmetric.  
• Axiom 3. Independence of irrelevant alternatives: for two bargaining 
problems ( , )dU and ( , )d′U , if ( , )f d′ ∈U U , then ( ) ( , )f f d′=U U . It basically says that 
the addition of irrelevant alternatives does not change the solution. 
• Axiom 4. Pareto efficiency: if u and u′ are two utility points in a bargaining 
problem ( , )dU  and u u′ > , then ( , )f d u≠U . This axiom requires the pareto-optimality of 
the bargaining solution.  
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The unique bargaining solution is then obtained by solving the following optimization 
problem: 
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )
( , )
( , ) maximize      ( )( )
u u d d
u u
f d arg u d u d
>
∈
= − −
U
U
   
                                   (17)             
The objective is named Nash product, which is later extended in n-person bargaining 
game [64]. The solution to this problem is referred to as Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS), an 
important solution concept in game theory, has the properties of simplicity and robustness. 
Empirical evidences to support NBS are indicated in experimental bargaining theory given in 
reference [65].  
3.4.2 Bargaining on RE Interconnection: An Analytical Model 
Suppose that a RE-GenCo has decided to build a RE generating unit at some remote 
location, and financing of the capital 0 ($)C has been secured. The maximum available output 
of the RE unit is denoted by ( )r MW , a random variable with probability density function 
(pdf) ( )g r and cumulative density function (cdf) ( )G r , subject to the variability of the 
renewable resource. The model also assumes production cost ($ / )RC MWh and renewable 
energy subsidies ($ / )RS MWh are constant. 
As discussed earlier, the RE-GenCo (denoted by subscript R in the formulation) seeks 
out a TransCo (denoted by subscript T) to invest in transmission lines to interconnect the RE 
project and to deliver its output to distance load centers. The per-unit cost to the TransCo for 
the generation interconnection transmission is represented by ($ / )TC MWh . The price for the 
renewable energy is represented by a fixed payment ($ / )RD MWh . The two parties negotiate 
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and try to reach an agreement on the payment rate ($ / )MWhλ  corresponding to the agreed 
upon transmission capacity ( )TF MW . 
Note that the output for the RE generation RP is constrained by the lower value of the 
maximum available output r and the transmission capacity TF , i.e. 
( , )R TP min r F=                                                          (18)                    
Using these representations, the RE-GenCo’s utility is the expected profit (EPR), 
·[ ]R R R R Ru EP D S C λ= + − −                                             (19)                 
and the TransCo’s utility is given as  
·T R T Tu EP F Cλ= −                                                    (20)                      
Note that their threat points are 0( ,0)C . 
    Applying Nash bargaining theory, the decision variables λ and TF
 
can be solved 
by maximizing the Nash Production (NP) 
, 0max [ ( , ) ] ( , )TF R T T TNP u F C u Fλ λ λ= − ⋅                             (21) 
The solution can be found if 0Ru >
 
and 0Tu > . 
Take the first order derivatives with respect to λ  and TF , 
0[ ]R TT R
u uNP
u u C
λ λ λ
∂ ∂∂
= + −
∂ ∂ ∂
                                        (22) 
0[ ]R TT R
T T T
u uNP
u u C
F F F
∂ ∂∂
= + −
∂ ∂ ∂
                                       (23) 
Note that REP in equations (19) and (20) is a function of TF due to (18), 
( , )R r TEP E min r F= . When r>FT, min(r,FT)=FT; when r<=FT, min(r,FT)=r, the expectation 
then is  
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0
0 0
0
0
· ( ) |
[1 ( )] ( )
[1 ( )] [ ( )] ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
T
T
T T
T
T
R T T r F
F
T T
F F
T T
F
T T T T T
F
T
EP F Pr r F E
F G F rg r dr
F G F d rG r G r dr
F F G F F G F G r dr
G d
r
F r r
≤= > +
= − +
= − + −
= − + −
= −
∫
∫ ∫
∫
∫
                           (24) 
From (24), the partial derivative of REP with respect to TF can be expressed as 
1 ( )R T
T
EP G F
F
∂
= −
∂
                                                         (25) 
The partial derivative of Ru and Tu with respect to λ and TF can be obtained, i.e.,  
/R Ru EPλ∂ ∂ = −                                                                    (26) 
/ [1 ( )] [ ]R T T R R Ru F G F D S C λ∂ ∂ = − × + − −                            (27) 
/T Ru EPλ∂ ∂ =
                                                                    
 (28) 
/ [1 ( )]T T T Tu F G F Cλ∂ ∂ = − × −
 
                                            (29) 
Insert equations (26)-(29) into equations (22) and (23),  
0[ ]r T R R
NP EP u EP u C
λ
∂
= − × + −
∂
                                            (30) 
0[1 ( )][ ] [[1 ( )] ][ ]T R R R T T T R
T
NP G F D S C u G F C u C
F
λ λ
∂
= − + − − × + − − −
∂
     
 (31)  
The solution can be found when the above two equations equal to 0. Then equation 
(30) becomes 
0[ ] 0R R TEP u C u− − =                                             (32) 
The expected RE output REP is normally positive, and hence (32) satisfies only when 
0R Tu C u− =                                                       (33) 
which is the logical outcome in which the utility is equally divided between the RE-GenCo 
and the TransCo. 
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The relation between λ and TF can be derived by replacing Ru and Tu in (33) with (19) 
and (20) 
0[ ]R R R R R T TEP D S C C EP F Cλ λ+ − − − = −                           (34) 
Re-expressing the equation, one obtains 
0
2 2
T TR R R
R
C F CD S C
EP
λ
−+ −
= −                                     (35) 
Similarly, set equation (31) equal to 0, replace 0Ru C− with Tu , and omit positive Tu . 
Equation (31) can be rewritten as 
[1 ( )][ ] 0T R R R TG F D S C C− + − − =                                  (36) 
TF
 
then can be solved in the following explicit form 
11 TT
R R R
CF G
D S C
−  = −  + − 
                               
   (37)                 
andλ can be found by replacing TF in (35) with (37).  
It is observed the negotiated payment rate λ and invested transmission capacity 
TF can be explicitly determined in this model with the consideration of the RE output 
uncertainty. However, since the transmission investment is lumpy in nature, the transmission 
plan is likely to consist of a set of discrete transmission candidates. Hence a more careful 
examination of the negotiation process and a detailed formulation to handle the lumpy 
investment are needed. 
3.4.3 Bargaining on RE Interconnection: A Detailed Formulation 
The bargaining process on RE interconnection is formulated as a bi-level 
optimization problem. The Nash product is maximized in the upper level problem, while a set 
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of lower problems represents the market operations anticipated by the RE-GenCo and the 
TransCo, for every hour t and scenario s. 
The detailed formulation is given below, with the RE-GenCo's utility RGU and the 
TransCo's utility TU denoted by (14) and (16). Suppose the negotiation is intended to connect 
the RE unit Ir at Bus r, the bargaining problem is then formulated as:  
[ ]
,
max ( , ) ( , , ) 
k
RG Rts RG T Rts kY
U P IC U P Y
λ
λ λ− ×
                            
     (38) 
Subject to  
( , )RG Rts RGU P ICλ ≥                                                 (39) 
 ( , , ) 0T Rts kU P Yλ ≥                                                   (40) 
CT CT
k R k
k k
M Y M Yλ
∈Ω ∈Ω
− ≤ ≤∑ ∑                                        (41) 
r
b
Ir
G
Rts I bts
b
P P
∈Ω
= ∑                                                  (42)                        
where  , ,Rts T SP t s∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω =  
   max
G L L b G bibts jbts n j i
L L G G
jb jbts ib ibts
P P j b i b
arg P Pλ λ
∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
−∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                            (43) 
Subject to   
| ( ) | ( )
0,   ( ),
L b
n j
L
jbts kts kts nts N
k o k n k r k nj b
P F F LMP n
= =∈Ω ∈Ω
+ − = ∀ ∈Ω∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                   (44) 
0 , ,G G TG bibts ib iP P i b≤ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω                                        (45) 
 0 , ,G G RG bibts ibts iP P i b≤ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω                                        (46) 
( ) ( )
1 [ ], ETkts o k ts r k ts
k
F k
X
δ δ= − ∀ ∈Ω                                   (47) 
,
ET
k kts kF F F k− ≤ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω                                           (48) 
( ) ( )
1(1 ) [ ] (1 ) , CTk kts o k ts r k ts k
k
Y M F Y M k
X
δ δ− − ≤ − − ≤ − ∀ ∈Ω                   (49) 
,
CT
k k kts k kY F F Y F k− ≤ ≤ ∀ ∈Ω                                      (50) 
62 
 
The upper level problem, consisting of equations (38)-(40), reflects the requirement 
in Nash bargaining problem. Inequality (41) is an additional constraint demanding zero 
payment if no transmission line is invested. Equality (42) collects the total dispatched 
renewable energy output from all offer blocks of the RE unit which is to be interconnected. 
For each hour t and scenario s, a corresponding lower-level problem (43)-(50) reflects the 
market operation with LMPs, dispatched generation output, and transmission flow. The 
objective of the lower-level problems (43) is to maximize market operation net surplus. 
Constraint (44) enforces real power balance at each bus. Constraints (45) and (46) impose 
generation capacity limit on non-renewable and renewable generating units, respectively. 
Note that the maximum available output for some RE unit i, GibtsP  varies in hours and 
scenarios, allowing for the variability of renewable resources.  
Constraints (47)-(50) enforce transmission limits for existing and candidate 
transmission lines. Regarding constraint (49), the constraint is active and M is set at 0 when 
Yk = 1 or the investment decision is affirmative. However, if Yk = 0 or the investment 
decision is negative, M is set to be a large number meaning that this constraint is not active 
and therefore not considered. 
This formulation could be modified to consider market-based renewable energy price 
(LMPs) received by the RE-GenCo, if it does not enter into a bilateral contract. Its utility 
function in objective function (38) can be replaced by , ),(MRG Rts RtsPU LMP λ  given in equation 
(15). The utility function is now determined by both the renewable energy production RtsP  
and its market price RtsLMP . 
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3.5 Implications on Renewable Subsidy Policy 
A centralized transmission planning model is described in this section that will  
provide a benchmark of social optimal transmission investment, for contrasting the 
negotiated transmission plans described in Section 3.4. Policy implications on renewable 
energy subsidies will be derived by proposing an analytical model and a detailed formulation, 
where renewable subsidies are used as a critical and adjustable parameter to steer the 
negotiated solution towards a centralized solution. 
3.5.1 Centralized Planning and Policy Implication 
Suppose a centralized planner, who performs the traditional Integrated Resource 
Planning function, decides to interconnect a RE unit by planning and investing in a new 
transmission line. Considering the benefit BR ($/MWh) from the renewable energy, the 
centralized planner needs to make a decision on the invested transmission capacity FT to 
maximize social surplus: 
maximize   
T
R R R R T TF
SS EP B EP C F C= × − × −
                            (51) 
The same notation in Section 3.4.2 is used in (51). Take the derivative of SS with 
respect to FT and set it equal 0, i.e., 
[ ]R R R T
T T
dEPdSS B C C
dF dF
= − −                                                    (52) 
0 [1 ( )][ ]T R R TG F B C C= − − −                                             (53) 
FT in the centralized planning model can be solved explicitly as follows, 
11 TT
R R
CF G
B C
−  = −  − 
                                                (54) 
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Comparing the negotiated solution (37) with the centralized solution (54), the 
adjustable parameter of renewable energy subsidies, SR can be utilized to steer the negotiated 
solution towards the benchmark solution by equating (37) and (54), 
R R R R RD S C B C+ − = −                                              (55) 
R R RS B D= −                                                     (56) 
Equation (56) indicates that the optimal renewable energy subsidies should be set as 
the difference between the benefit from the RE generation and the payment for purchasing 
renewable energy. Of course, determining the benefit received is not a trivial task. In any 
event, policy makers can use this result as guidance for renewable energy subsidy policy, and 
establish a subsidy mechanism that provides merchant investors with sufficient market 
incentives for achieving social optimal transmission investment plans.  
3.5.2 An Illustrative Example  
A simple example is presented to illustrate the principle of the negotiation model and 
demonstrate the important role of policy in moving the bargaining solution to an idealistic 
solution that is societal beneficial.    
The bi-level negotiation process depicted in Section 3.4 is elaborated by means of the 
payoff matrix. The solutions for the negotiation model, in the two situations with or without 
renewable energy, are compared with that in the centralized model.  
As shown in Figure 17, a RE-GenCo is going to make a decision on a wind farm 
investment.  The company has two options. 
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• Option [1]: Investing at location [1] with cost $2/MW, it will be able to 
generate 19MWh wind energy at the price of $1/MWh, and pay a rate 1Rλ to 
the TransCo for transmission investment cost recovery.  
• Option [2]: Investing at location [2] with cost $2/MW, it will be able to 
generate 13MWh wind energy at the price of $1/MWh, and pay a rate 2Rλ to 
the TransCo for transmission investment cost recovery.  
Similarly, the TransCo has two options as follows: 
• Option (1): TransCo will build the transmission along path (1) with capacity 
19MW; its investment cost is $10, and TransCo receives 1Rλ from the GenCo. 
• Option (2): TransCo will build the transmission along path (2) with capacity 
13MW; its investment cost is $4, and TransCo receives 2Rλ  from the GenCo.  
 
Figure 17. Options for renewable generation and transmission investment 
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Correspondingly, LSE will receive three different levels of benefit, depending on the 
negotiation results of the RE-GenCo and the TransCo.  
• Benefit (a): If both the GenCo and the TransCo choose [1] and (1), LSE will 
have a utility level of $14. 
• Benefit (b): If they choose [2] and (2), LSE will have a utility level of $10. 
• Benefit (c): LSE will have 0 otherwise. 
In the first case there is no renewable energy subsidy, the payoff matrix for the 
GenCo and the TransCo then can be expressed as follows: 
 
TransCo 
(1) (2) 
GenCo [1] 1 11 2 10, )(19 R Rλ λ× − − −  (-2,-4) [2] (-1,-6) 2 21 1 , 4(13 )R Rλ λ× − − −  
 
Their negotiated result is the solution to maximize the product of their utilities, for 
example, 
1 1 1
 [19 1 2 ]x 0]m 1a [
R R Rλ
λ λ× − − − . Therefore, the solutions are 1 13.5Rλ = , 2 8Rλ = .  
The payoff matrix is then 
 
TransCo 
(1) (2) 
GenCo [1] (3.5,3.5) (-2,-4) [2] (-1,-6) (4,4) 
  
The payoff matrix for LSE is determined by the negotiated result of the GenCo and 
the TransCo.  
 
TransCo 
(1) (2) 
GenCo [1] 14 0 [2] 0 10 
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Following the analysis of Nash Bargaining theory, the GenCo and the TransCo will 
choose the option ([2], (2)) which maximizes their utility levels since Nash Product of (4, 4) 
is greater than (3.5, 3.5).  
Nevertheless, considering the social surplus which now involves the utility level from 
LSE besides the two negotiators, the social optimal investment plan should be settled at ([1], 
(1)). Indeed, the total social surplus achieved by ([1], (1)), 3.5+3.5+14=21, clearly exceeds 
the total social surplus by ([2], (2)), 4+4+10=18.  
In this case, the negotiated result does not match the centralized investment plan. 
Hence, the social surplus maximization is not achieved.  
Now consider how subsidy can help to steer the negotiated result to a centralized 
social optimal solution. Suppose the RE-GenCo is subsidized by $0.5/MWh. The revenue 
stream of the RE-GenCo now includes this subsidy in addition to the original energy sale. 
Note that this subsidy will not alter the optimal solution for the centralized model; rather, it 
will only re-distribute the total social surplus. 
However, the payoff matrix for the RE-GenCo and the TransCo has been changed: 
 
TransCo 
(1) (2) 
GenCo [1] 1 1(19 191 2 0. ,5 10)R Rλ λ× − −+− ×  (-2,-4) [2] (-1,-6) 2 2(13 11 1 0.5, 43 )R Rλ λ+× − − × −  
 
The two companies negotiate the payment rate under the different investment plans, 
resulting in 1 18.25Rλ =
 
or 2 11.25Rλ = . 
The numerical representation of the matrix becomes 
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TransCo 
(1) (2) 
GenCo 
[1] (8.25,8.25) (-2,-4) 
[2] (-1,-6) (7.25,7.25) 
 
Apparently, Option ([1], (1)) outperforms Option ([2], (2)) in terms of greater utility 
levels for both companies. Therefore, ([1], (1)) becomes the new negotiated result in this 
subsidy environment. The subsidy $0.5/MWh indeed plays a crucial role in steering the 
negotiated solution to a centralized solution and successfully achieves social optimality.  
3.5.3 Centralized Planning: A Detailed Formulation 
The detailed formulation of the centralized planning model, which allows for 
uncertainties and realistic constraints, is presented below. 
, ,
maximize [ ]
G L S
L b b CTibts jbts k
T Gj i
L L G G
s t jb jbts ib ibts k k
P P Y t ij b b k
E D P P ICT Yλ λ∈Ω
∈Ω ∈Ω∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω ∈Ω
− −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑               (57) 
Subject to 
,  T St s∀ ∈Ω ∀ ∈Ω  
(44)— (50) 
The objective function is to maximize social surplus composed of operation surplus 
minus the transmission investment cost. The operation constraints are identical with the ones 
in the negotiated model as given in equations (44)-(50).    
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3.6 Numerical Results 
3.6.1 Garver’s Six-Bus Test Case 
The detailed formulation for the negotiation on RE interconnection is studied with 
Garver's six-bus test case in Figure 18, which comprises six buses, six existing transmission 
lines, three generating units, and five loads. The generator at Bus 6 is assumed to be a RE or 
wind resource. In this study, transmission lines between Bus 6 and the grid are needed to 
deliver the RE output to the load. The supply offer and demand bid data for the two 
traditional generators and 5 loads are given in Table 9. The number and size of blocks vary 
for each market participant.  
A constant production cost is assumed for the wind generator WG3 at Bus 6 and its 
cost and operation data are given in Table 10. The third column is its investment cost ICRG 
that will be used as the RE-GenCo’s threat point in the negotiation process. The renewable 
energy contract price FP is given in the fourth column. Prate denotes the nameplate capacity 
of the wind unit. The maximum possible output Pmax is characterized by the non-linear 
function between wind speed v and Prate with three parameters of WG3: cut-in, cut-out and 
rated wind speed Vci, Vco and Vrate. The non-linear feature can be described by the following 
[30]: 
0 0
( ) / ( )
0
ci
rate ci rate ci ci rate
max
rate rate co
c
v v
P v V V V V v V
P
P V v V
V o v
≤ <
 − − ≤ <
= 
≤ ≤
 <
                             
(58) 
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Table 9. Generator and load data 
 Generators Loads 
Bus G Offer Size 
(MW) 
Offer Price 
($/MWh) 
L Bid Size 
(MW) 
Bid Price 
($/MWh) 
1 G1 [200;100;100] [21;23;28] L1 [40;40] [43;30] 
2    L2 [80;80;80] [54;50;48] 
3 G2 [210;210;140] [30;34;43] L3 [20;20] [30;26] 
4    L4 [80;80] [45;32] 
5    L5 [80;80;80] [50;42;30] 
 
Table 10. Wind unit data 
Bus Name 
Investment 
Cost (106$) 
Cost 
($/MWh) 
FP Prate Vci Vrate Vco 
6 WG3 10 2 12 600 4 10 22 
 
Bus 1
Bus 2
Bus 3
Bus 4
Bus 5
Bus 6
600
G1
G2
L1L5
L2
L4
L3
WG3
RE-GenCo TransCo
 
Figure 18. Garver’s six-bus test system 
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Table 11. Transmission data 
Name 
From 
Bus 
To 
Bus 
Reactance 
(Ω ) 
Limit 
(MW) 
Cost 
(106$) 
Type 
T1 1 2 0.4 250 - E(xisting) 
T2 1 4 0.6 220 - E 
T3 1 5 0.2 300 - E 
T4 2 3 0.2 300 - E 
T5 3 5 0.2 300 - E 
T6 2 6 0.3 150 8.0 C(andidate) 
T7 2 6 0.15 300 13 C 
T8 3 6 0.4 150 9.2 C 
T9 3 6 0.3 200 10 C 
T10 4 6 0.3 200 11 C 
 
Table 11 presents the data for the existing and candidate transmission lines. Five 
transmission investment candidates (T6-T10) are proposed with the intent to connect Bus 6 
to the grid. The pattern of transmission costs follows the economies of scale, e.g. building 
one 300-MW line between Buses 2 and 6 is less expensive than building two 150MW lines 
connecting these two buses.  
To accommodate the variability from wind resource, three scenarios of wind speed 
are constructed for four subperiods in a year, which are represented by four seasons with 
equal time duration, i.e. 1·8760 2190
4
h h= . The wind speed data in each scenario and 
subperiod is given in  
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Table 12. Using the function (58), the maximum possible output of WG3 can be 
calculated, and the result is shown in Table 13. Note that the wind unit normally generates 
more renewable energy during the Fall and Winter season due to ample wind resources.  
 
Table 12. Scenarios of wind speed in four subperiods 
Scenario Spring Summer Fall Winter 
S1=High wind 7 5 10 9 
S2=Medium wind 5 5 8 9 
S3=Low wind 2 1 5 8 
 
Table 13. Maximum possible output of wind energy 
Scenario Spring Summer Fall Winter 
S1=High wind 300 100 600 500 
S2=Medium wind 100 100 400 500 
S3=Low wind 0 0 100 400 
 
3.6.2 The Negotiated Solution with Renewable Energy Contract Price FP 
All combinations of the 5 transmission candidates were examined and no negotiation 
solution is reached without a subsidy. The renewable energy subsidy is then fixed at 
SUB=$5/MWh and the negotiated solutions are examined using renewable energy contract 
price FP. The negotiated transmission investment plan YN is reported in Table 14. The 
negotiated payment λ and the attained utility levels for each party are given in Table 15. 
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Table 14. Negotiated transmission investment decision YN 
Candidate Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
Decision 0 1 0 0 0 
 
Table 15. Negotiated results of payment rate and attained utilities 
URG(106$) URG-ICRG(106$) UT(106$) λR ($/MWh) 
10.54 0.54 0.54 8.43 
It is observed that in the settlement, the RE-GenCo would like to pay the TransCo 
$8.43/MWh for recovering the cost of transmission investment on candidate line 7. The value 
of the 2nd and 3rd columns are identical, indicating the utility function for the RE-GenCo is 
the same as the utility function for the TransCo (i.e. equal utility split) which verifies 
equation (33) established in the analytical model for bargaining over transmission investment.  
3.6.3 The Negotiated Solution with Market-Based Price LMP 
Although most renewable energy developers enter into bilateral contracts to secure a 
fixed electricity price, they can also choose to receive LMPs in market settlement. In this 
situation, its market-based utility function MRGU  is used in the negotiation process. Using the 
same subsidy parameter SUB at $5/MWh, the new investment transmission plan  MNY  and the 
associated utility levels are shown in Table 16. 
The market-based negotiation results show more transmission investments. 
Specifically, the resulted plan suggests building 2 lines to Bus 2 and 1 line to bus 3, making 
the wind generator bus an integral part of the system. Comparing Table 16 with Table 15, a 
significantly higher utility and transmission rate are also attained. For example, UT is raised 
from $0.54 million to $11.73 million and the negotiated rate is $18.88/MWh .The increases 
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are due primarily to higher generator revenues from LMPs than that obtained from contract 
price FP.   
Table 16. Negotiated transmission plan MNY and utility levels 
Trans plan 
Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
1 1 0 1 0 
Utility  
levels 
M
RGU  
M
RGU -ICRG UT λR   
21.73 11.73 11.73 18.88  
 
By investing in the 3 lines and transforming the generator bus into a system bus, the 
RE generator output are not constrained in any scenarios. Hence, the energy price or LMP for 
the RE generator output is always determined by the system marginal units and not by the 
cheaper wind generator. As a result, the expected higher generator revenue due to higher 
market-based price (LMP) allows the RE-GenCo to make higher profits and to pay for 
additional transmission.  
3.6.4 Centralized Transmission Planning 
In Section 3.5.1, an optimal RE subsidy parameter SUB is explicitly obtained for 
steering the negotiated solution on transmission investment to the social optimal solution. 
This section will examine the possibility of adjusting RE subsidy parameter to achieve the 
goal in a more comprehensive formulation.  
As shown in Section 3.5.3, optimization problem (57) is solved for the centralized 
solution targeting to maximize social surplus. The solution YC is then obtained in Table 17. 
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Table 17. Centralized transmission investment decision Yc 
Candidate Y6 Y7 Y8 Y9 Y10 
Decision 1 1 0 0 0 
 
Compared to previous negotiated results, candidate line T6 and T7 are the 2 lines to 
be invested by the centralized planning in order to maximize the social surplus. The achieved 
social surpluses under different investment decisions are compared in Table 18. The 
centralized planning gives the maximum social surplus, while the negotiated decision, when 
the RE-GenCo is settled at market-based prices—LMPs, results in the lowest social surplus. 
This is not surprising since the negotiation between the RE-GenCo and the TransCo is 
focused on their profits from the investment decision and not on the overall social surplus. YN 
gives low social surplus due to underinvestment in transmission lines (T7), and MNY
 
results in 
an even lower social surplus due to the overinvestment in transmission lines (T6, T7 and T9).  
Table 18. Social surplus under different investment decisions 
Decisions NY  MNY  CY  
Social Surplus ($106) 137.96 136.38 142.55 
3.6.5 RE Subsidy Sensitivity Analysis 
This section is concerned with the possibility of adjusting the subsidies SUB to drive 
the negotiated solution towards the maximum social surplus derived from the centralized 
planning decision. The sensitivity analysis of SUB on transmission planning decisions and 
negotiated payment rate are shown in Figure 19-Figure 21.  
Note that the simulation result includes the use of negative values for SUB, 
representing penalties rather than subsides for generating renewable energy. This negative 
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value can be used to model cost overrun, high financial charges on capital, or costs incurred 
from project delay.  
Figure 19 shows that there is no negotiated transmission plan when SUB is between 
$-10/MWh and $5/MWh. When SUB is between $7/MWh and $41/MWh, the negotiated 
result is [1 1 0 0 0], which is exactly the centralized plan and the maximum social surplus 
solution. Beyond $42/MWh, even though the higher subsidies would afford more 
transmission investments, the resultant social surplus is less than the case when the subsidy is 
between $7/MWh to $41/MWh. This implies that, policy makers can always increase 
subsidies to incentivize transmission investments to attain the maximum social surplus goal. 
Nevertheless, excessive subsidies can lead to more transmission but not necessarily higher 
overall social surplus. 
 
 
Figure 19. Transmission plan variation under SUB with contract price FP 
 
However, when RE-GenCo receives LMP instead of FP, Figure 20 shows that the 
subsidy SUB has limitations to function as a controllable parameter for steering the 
negotiated transmission investment decision to the social optimal solution. This implies that, 
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due to the LMP uncertainty, subsidies may help to reach an investment decision but may be 
restricted for achieving social optimal investment plans.  
 
Figure 20. Transmission plan variation under SUB with market-based price LMP  
This observation is further demonstrated in Figure 21 and Figure 22 in which the 
negotiated transmission rate increases piece-wise linearly with subsidies. Figure 21 also 
shows step changing of Rλ  when SUB alters the negotiated transmission plans. However, 
Figure 22 exhibits only one-time step up of payment rate when subsidies are sufficient to 
form an agreement in the negotiation. No more step changing but only linear changing of Rλ  
is shown after the agreement, due to the limited controllability of subsidies.  
 
Figure 21. Payment rate variation under SUB with contract price FP 
78 
 
 
Figure 22  Payment rate variation under SUB with market-based price LMP 
 
Based on the observations, this case study leads to the following suggestions: 
(1)  The Nash Bargaining theory guides the negotiation process. The results show that 
the RE-GenCo and the TransCo equally split utilities attained from renewable energy 
investment. The Nash Bargaining solution renders a fair and efficient utility allocation 
between the two companies. 
(2)  Subsidies are critical for RE-GenCos and TransCos to reach an investment 
agreement during the proposed negotiation process. It can also steer the negotiated solution 
to the centralized solution which achieves maximum social surplus when the electricity price 
is fixed through renewable energy contracts.  
(3)  Due to market price uncertainties, the controllability of subsidies is limited when 
RE-GenCos do not sign a renewable energy contract. This limitation needs to be recognized 
in the design of subsidies.  
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CHAPTER 4. CONCLUSION 
4.1 Summary of the Dissertation 
This dissertation addresses the issues associated with the short-term transmission 
operation and long-term transmission planning. A congestion forecasting algorithm is 
developed to assist market operators and market participants in short-run decision making. In 
long-term transmission planning, the issues of negotiation and policy making for integrating 
renewable energy are investigated.  
Short-term congestion forecasting is critical for both market traders and market 
operators. Congestion forecasting helps to explain electricity price behaviors and facilitates 
decision making of power market participants. 
In Chapter 2, this dissertation proposes a basic scenario-conditioned forecasting 
algorithm that permits the short-term forecasting of congestion, prices, and other power 
system variables conditional on a given generating unit commitment pattern and transmission 
network topology.  This basic algorithm uses the novel concept of “system pattern” to permit 
structural capacity constraints on generation and transmission to be taken into consideration  
in the forecasting procedure.   
To handle practical data-availability concerns, an extension of this basic algorithm is 
then proposed in a probabilistic framework that can be implemented on the basis of publicly 
available information. The accuracy of this probabilistic algorithm relative to a more 
traditional GARCH statistical forecasting model is demonstrated with a NYISO case study.  
A cross-scenario extension of this forecasting algorithm is proposed in which 
probabilities are assigned to different scenarios. This permits forecasters to probabilistically 
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average forecasts across distinct scenarios, allowing the use of longer forecast horizons 
and/or increasingly available historical data. 
Chapter 3 is concerned with the issue of transmission investment to integrate 
renewable energy. A negotiation methodology has been proposed between a renewable 
energy developer and a transmission company for sharing renewable energy uncertainties 
and market risks.  
The rate or payment, which is paid by the RE developer to the TransCo for 
transmission cost recovery, is established via a negotiation methodology based on Nash 
Bargaining theory. Both the analytical and numerical solutions of the transmission plan and 
payment are derived for the negotiation. The practicality of the proposed approach and the 
Nash Bargaining solution provide important investment guidance to both generation and 
transmission developers. 
If the projected generation performance and market prices do not render an agreement, 
a renewable energy subsidy may be needed to incentivize transmission projects to meet the 
RPS requirement. The proposed approach can be used by policy makers to develop a proper 
subsidy to RE developer for reaching an agreement in a negotiation.  
The findings show that transmission investment plans and payment rate can be 
effectively determined in the negotiation using the Nash bargaining approach. By comparing 
the negotiation and the centralized planning model, an optimal subsidy policy can be 
obtained to achieve maximum social surplus. It is also recognized that the controllability of 
subsidies is limited due to electricity price uncertainties when RE-GenCos sign no renewable 
energy contracts.  
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4.2 Future Work 
The two approaches for transmission operation and planning are developed under 
some assumptions. The future work can be aimed at more generalized and practical 
approaches with realistic considerations.  
In Chapter 2, the proposed algorithm is targeted for energy-only markets; future work 
should consider the incorporation of ancillary services. Future work can also explore 
additional factors, such as possible strategic supply offer behaviors by generators. Moreover, 
alternative forms for the probabilistic point inclusion test, a key building block of the 
proposed algorithm, will be systematically studied.  
In Chapter 3, future work can consider the use of more realistic scenarios for handling 
renewable energy uncertainties by exploiting more advanced scenario generation methods, 
for example, a moment-matching method developed in [66]. Future work could also be the 
extension of this approach to a multi-player negotiation that consists of multiple market 
participants including LSEs, policy makers, additional RE and transmission developers. 
Furthermore, the issue of asymmetric accessible information for different market participants 
should be examined.  
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APPENDIX.  PROOF 
Consider a wholesale power market operating over a transmission grid with N buses. 
Assume for simplicity that each bus i has one fixed load denoted by Li and one generator 
with a real power level denoted by Pi.  Suppose, also, that each generator i has a quadratic 
total cost function with coefficients ia  and ib . Finally, suppose the objective of the market 
operator in each hour is to minimize the total system cost of meeting fixed load subject to an 
injection-equals-load balance constraint, transmission line flow limits, and generator 
operating capacity limits.   
In particular, suppose the market operator attempts to achieve its objective in each 
hour by using the following standard DC-OPF formulation that assumes a lossless 
transmission system: 
2
1
min [ ]
N
i i i iP i
a P b P
=
+∑                                                    (59) 
1 1
. .  0 :   
N N
i i
i i
s t P L λ
= =
− =∑ ∑                                                  (60)                                
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[ ] F :   ,   for 1:
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ij i i j
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P L j Tβ µ+ +
=
− ≤ =∑                                       (61)            
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1
[ ] F :   ,   for 1:
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ij i i j
i
P L j Tβ µ− −
=
− − ≤ =∑                                      (62)          
:   ,   for 1:U Ui i iP Cap i Nσ≤ =
                                    
   (63)          
:   ,   for 1:L Li i iP Cap i Nσ− ≤ − =                                      (64)            
In these equations, ijβ denotes the Generation Shift Factor (GSF) that measures the 
impact of 1MW injection by generator i on transmission line j.  Equality (60) represents the 
system balance constraint ensuring total generation matches total load.  The transmission line 
83 
 
flow limit constraints in two directions are expressed in (61) and (62). The last two 
inequalities (63) and (64) express each generator’s upper and lower operating capacity limits.  
Proposition 1: Consider the standard DC-OPF formulation with fixed loads and 
quadratic generator cost functions described in (59) through (64). Suppose this standard 
formulation is used by a market operator to determine system variable solutions.  Then,  
conditional on any given commitment-and-line scenario S, the load space can be covered by 
convex polytopes such that: (i) the interior of each convex polytope corresponds to a unique 
system pattern; and (ii) within the interior of each convex polytope the system variable 
solutions can be expressed as linear-affine functions of the vector of distributed loads. 
Proof Outline [44]: First note that the DC-OPF formulation can equivalently be 
expressed in the following compact form: 
1
min
2
T T
P
P HP Pα+                                                         (65) 
1 1 1 1. .   :   s t G P W S L= + Λ                                       (66) 
and, for 2 : (1 2 2 ) i N T= + +  
:   i i i iG P W S L≤ + Λ                                                    (67) 
The notation in this general QP problem is described in [44]. The KKT first-order 
necessary conditions for (65)-(67) can then be expressed as follows: 
0THP Gα+ + Λ =                                                      (68) 
1 1 1 0G P W S L− − =                                                     (69) 
 and, for 2 : (1 2 2 ),i N T= + +  
( ) 0i i i iG P W S LΛ − − =                                               (70) 
0iΛ ≥                                                               (71)  
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0i i iG P W S L− − ≤                                                    (72) 
Let A  denote the set of indices corresponding to the active (binding) equality and 
inequality constraints for the DC-OPF problem. If the number of binding unit capacity 
constraints and line limit constraints are denoted by R and M, respectively, then 
Cardinality( A ) = 1+R+M. Let GA , W A and S A represent the matrices corresponding to A . 
Then, GA ,W A and S A  have row dimension 1+R+M and column dimension N. Let ΛA denote 
the multiplier vector corresponding to A . Given A , equations (68)-(70)reduce to 
0G P W S L− − =A A A                                                       (73) 
( ) 0THP Gα+ + Λ =A A                                                     (74) 
Tøndel [46] defines the linear independence constraint qualification (LICQ) for an 
active set of constraints to be the assumption that these constraints are linearly independent. 
For the problem at hand, LICQ holds if GA  has full row rank. A generator that is at its upper 
capacity limit cannot at the same time be at its lower limit, hence [1 0 · · · 0] and [−1 0 · · · 0] 
never co-exist. Moreover, the GSF matrix included in GA  has linearly independent rows. 
Thus, rank(GA) = min[1+R+M, N]. It follows that GA has full row rank 1+R+M if 
1 R M N+ + ≤                                                             (75) 
The regularity condition (75) requires that the number of binding constraints 
[1+R+M] does not exceed the number of decision variables N, a necessary condition for the 
existence of the DC-OPF problem solutions assumed to exist in Proposition 1. Consequently, 
(75) automatically holds under the assumptions of Proposition 1. 
11 1( )TG H G G H W S Lα−− −   Λ = − + +   A A A A A A                               (76) 
11 1 1 1( ) ( )T TP H H G G H G G H W S Lα α−− − − −   = − + + +   A A A A A A                      (77) 
( )11 10 ( ) ,    /{1}T
i
G H G G H W S L iα
−− −   ≤ − + + ∀ ∈   
A A A A A A/                       (78) 
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11 1 1 1( ) ( ) ,   /{1}T Ti i iW S L G H H G G H G G H W S L iα α
−− − − −    + ≥ − + + + ∀ ∈     
A A A A A A A/         (79) 
Given the LICQ (75) and the diagonal form of the matrix H, 1( )TG H G−A A is 
invertible. Equations (73) and (74) can then be used to derive explicit solutions for ΛA and 
P as shown in equations (76) and (77). Note that these solutions are linear-affine functions of 
the load vector L. 
In summary, given a particular load vector L, explicit solutions have been derived for 
P  and ΛA as linear-affine functions of L. However, by construction, as long as the set A  of 
active constraints remains unchanged in a neighborhood of the load vector L in the load space 
L, the linear-affine form of these solutions remains optimal. Such a neighborhood is given by 
the feasible region determined from (71) and (72). Substituting ΛA and P  from equations 
(76) and (77) into (71) and (72), one obtains inequalities (78) and (79). The load vectors L 
satisfying the latter inequalities are the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces in the 
load space, and hence they form a convex polytope in this load space.  
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